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Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is a nondiscretionary access control mechanism which allows the central security policy and as such is very suitable to large organizations environment. the concept of the rile is very close to the Unix concept of a group with two important differences;
RBAC enables more precise implementation of the Principle of Least Privilege. Subjects may login with most of their roles deactivated, and activate a role only when a particular right associated with the role is necessary.
With the past noise about SOX compliance one of the few things that would make sense was the implementation of RBAC under the sauce of SOX compliance. Most of SOX activity resembled Y2K craze and also was equally useless, expensive and superficial effort that benefited mainly large auditing firms and (to a lesser extent) companies with semi-useless or harmful security products. But good managers have has a unique opportunity to play their cards more intelligently and persuade upper-level PHBs to implement RBAC as panacea against all SOX-defined ills. Persuading higher level managers to implement RBAC under SOX-compliance sauce was actually relatively easy as SOX did not even specify what are "adequate internal control", nor which solutions organizations must implement in order to meet this particular requirement. In this case using RMAC as "adequate integral control" solution makes a lot of sense.
This opportunity to implement RBAC is now a water under the bridge but that does not mean that such opportunities will never arise again. This page tries to point you to the relevant resources. Solaris 10 and 11 has RBAC built-in, but other commercial Unixes have now implementation too (AIX 6 is one example).Role-based access control (RBAC) was introduced in 1992 by David Ferraiolo and Rick Kuhn of the NIST. In April of 2004 the American National Standards Institute approved Standard 359-2004: American National Standard for Information Technology—Role Based Access Control. NIST maintains a Web site dedicated to RBAC at http://csrc.nist.gov/rbac. There are two key principles of role-based access control:
From the point of view of security theory RBAC bases access control decisions on the functions a user is allowed to perform within an organization. The users cannot pass access permissions on to other users at their discretion. This is a fundamental difference between RBAC and DAC. That means that RBAC is in fact a form of mandatory access control, but unlike a typical MAC environment it is not based on multilevel security requirements (clearances and security labels). As defined in the TCSEC, MAC is:
A means of restricting access to objects based on the sensitivity (as represented by a label) of the information contained in the objects and the formal authorization (i.e. clearance) of subjects to access information of such sensitivity. [Orangebook]
RBAC can lower the cost and complexity of security administration of large servers. RBAC organize privileges into roles.
In large organizations, the application owners do not "own'' the information of the application for which he/she is responsible. For these organizations, the corporation itself or even some government agency is the actual "owner'' of system objects and application owner is simply a custodian.
The act of granting membership and specifying transactions for a role is loosely analogous to the process of clearing users (granting membership) and the labeling (association of operational sensitivities) of objects.
Unlike MAC where the main focus is on capability: who can read what information within a role-based system, the principal concern in RBAC is protecting the integrity of information: "who can perform what actions on what information''
A role can be thought of as a set of transactions that a user or set of users can perform within the context of an organization. Membership in a role is granted and revoked by a system administrator.
Roles are group oriented; the simplest model of roles is probably Unix groups implementation
The key questions here are:
Working with industry groups, the National Institute of Standards and Technology has developed a proposed standard, "Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules,'' (Federal Information Processing Standard 140-1) that will require support for access control and administration through roles.
To date, these role based systems have been mainly developed for use by military and intelligence. Trusted Solaris was workhorse of military since its Solaris 8. But the most robust implementation is provided by Solaris 10 which can be considered a classic implementation of RBAC in Unix systems.
Despite long history there is no commonly agreed upon definitions or recognition of formal standards, although Solaris 10 implementation serves as de-facto standard.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act establishes a set of requirements for financial systems, to deter fraud and increase corporate accountability. For information technology systems, regulators may need to know who used a system, when they logged in and out, what accesses or modifications were made to what files, and what authorizations were in effect. IT vendors responding to Sarbanes-Oxley requirements have adopted RBAC as central to compliance solutions because RBAC was designed to solve this type of problem.
This document is merely a re-sorting of the "Principles" output from the NAC 2001 Fall conference, which will hopefully act as a starting point to more comprehensive documentation. The conference material did not contain all of the "principles" that may apply to RBAC, but there were also some good ideas expressed in the contents that were not "principles" as well. This document re-sorts the conference document into "RBAC Principles" items and "Role Engineering Best Practices" items for further discussion.
Principle: A "principle", as used in this context, is a constant (some might call a "rule") that defines a particular behavior or characteristic that any RBAC system must include, exhibit or comply with.
Best Practice: A "best practice" can be an insight based on experience, a recommendation based on research, or even an opinion based on sound reasoning. In this case, certain "best practices" for role engineering or role discovery were contained within the NAC conference "Principle" document.
1. The RBAC system must delineate users, roles, and permissions.
2. A user can be assigned to multiple roles.
3. The system must support the notion of "Separation of Duty " constraints.
4. Must leverage existing standards to the extent possible.
5. An inheritance model must be supported so that a role can inherit rights other roles .
6. The permission with the least privilege applies, in cases where a user is assigned to multiple roles, and two or more roles define a permission on the same object.
7. The system must log changes to role assignments.
8. The system must provide an aggregated view of all permissions assigned to a particular user.
9. The system must provide a view of all users assigned to a particular permission.
110. There must be an administrative interface to add/change/delete roles, permissions and users – as well as the assignments of permissions to roles and roles to users.
111. A role should be able to map to one or more "groups" on one or more target systems.
112. "Users" can be people, applications, devices or functions.
Best Practices for Role Engineering:
1. Roles are abstractions of system entitlements that consider two design criteria:
- Consolidation of entities into meaningful groups that facilitate ease of administration.
- Collections of permissions that are meaningful to specific user communities
2. There are three basic approaches to role engineering:
- "Bottom Up": which derives roles from the groups and permissions defined on the existing systems and platforms in the enterprise.
- "Top Down": which derives roles from an analysis of business function and organizational criteria, typically from a "zero base" starting point.
- "Hybrid": which, as the name implies, derives roles using a combination of bottom up and top down approaches.
3. The top down approach typically is much more difficult to implement, because it will probably result in significant changes to legacy group and permission models.
4. The bottom up approach is typically easier to implement, because the RBAC system will overlay the legacy group and permission models.
5. A successful role definition approach will likely be a hybrid approach
6. The objective of role modeling is to maximize flexibility with minimal administrative effort.
7. Role engineering should consider how role and user administration is to be delegated. More decentralized models benefit from more top down analysis.
8. Top down role engineering will aggregate business processes into organizational parameters.
9. A top down approach can only be successful with participation and buy-in from business units.
110. A role typically maps to a group on a legacy system.
111. Successful implementation of RBAC benefits from a cultural commitment to define common roles that supercede individual privileges.
112. Roles do not have meaning unless they are used to define access privileges.
113. Plan for role life cycle management
114. Consider using use case modeling to validate role definitions.
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Links to Security-related conferences (great places to pick papers)
Groupthink : Two Party System as Polyarchy : Corruption of Regulators : Bureaucracies : Understanding Micromanagers and Control Freaks : Toxic Managers : Harvard Mafia : Diplomatic Communication : Surviving a Bad Performance Review : Insufficient Retirement Funds as Immanent Problem of Neoliberal Regime : PseudoScience : Who Rules America : Neoliberalism : The Iron Law of Oligarchy : Libertarian Philosophy
War and Peace : Skeptical Finance : John Kenneth Galbraith :Talleyrand : Oscar Wilde : Otto Von Bismarck : Keynes : George Carlin : Skeptics : Propaganda : SE quotes : Language Design and Programming Quotes : Random IT-related quotes : Somerset Maugham : Marcus Aurelius : Kurt Vonnegut : Eric Hoffer : Winston Churchill : Napoleon Bonaparte : Ambrose Bierce : Bernard Shaw : Mark Twain Quotes
Vol 25, No.12 (December, 2013) Rational Fools vs. Efficient Crooks The efficient markets hypothesis : Political Skeptic Bulletin, 2013 : Unemployment Bulletin, 2010 : Vol 23, No.10 (October, 2011) An observation about corporate security departments : Slightly Skeptical Euromaydan Chronicles, June 2014 : Greenspan legacy bulletin, 2008 : Vol 25, No.10 (October, 2013) Cryptolocker Trojan (Win32/Crilock.A) : Vol 25, No.08 (August, 2013) Cloud providers as intelligence collection hubs : Financial Humor Bulletin, 2010 : Inequality Bulletin, 2009 : Financial Humor Bulletin, 2008 : Copyleft Problems Bulletin, 2004 : Financial Humor Bulletin, 2011 : Energy Bulletin, 2010 : Malware Protection Bulletin, 2010 : Vol 26, No.1 (January, 2013) Object-Oriented Cult : Political Skeptic Bulletin, 2011 : Vol 23, No.11 (November, 2011) Softpanorama classification of sysadmin horror stories : Vol 25, No.05 (May, 2013) Corporate bullshit as a communication method : Vol 25, No.06 (June, 2013) A Note on the Relationship of Brooks Law and Conway Law
Fifty glorious years (1950-2000): the triumph of the US computer engineering : Donald Knuth : TAoCP and its Influence of Computer Science : Richard Stallman : Linus Torvalds : Larry Wall : John K. Ousterhout : CTSS : Multix OS Unix History : Unix shell history : VI editor : History of pipes concept : Solaris : MS DOS : Programming Languages History : PL/1 : Simula 67 : C : History of GCC development : Scripting Languages : Perl history : OS History : Mail : DNS : SSH : CPU Instruction Sets : SPARC systems 1987-2006 : Norton Commander : Norton Utilities : Norton Ghost : Frontpage history : Malware Defense History : GNU Screen : OSS early history
The Peter Principle : Parkinson Law : 1984 : The Mythical Man-Month : How to Solve It by George Polya : The Art of Computer Programming : The Elements of Programming Style : The Unix Hater’s Handbook : The Jargon file : The True Believer : Programming Pearls : The Good Soldier Svejk : The Power Elite
Most popular humor pages:
Manifest of the Softpanorama IT Slacker Society : Ten Commandments of the IT Slackers Society : Computer Humor Collection : BSD Logo Story : The Cuckoo's Egg : IT Slang : C++ Humor : ARE YOU A BBS ADDICT? : The Perl Purity Test : Object oriented programmers of all nations : Financial Humor : Financial Humor Bulletin, 2008 : Financial Humor Bulletin, 2010 : The Most Comprehensive Collection of Editor-related Humor : Programming Language Humor : Goldman Sachs related humor : Greenspan humor : C Humor : Scripting Humor : Real Programmers Humor : Web Humor : GPL-related Humor : OFM Humor : Politically Incorrect Humor : IDS Humor : "Linux Sucks" Humor : Russian Musical Humor : Best Russian Programmer Humor : Microsoft plans to buy Catholic Church : Richard Stallman Related Humor : Admin Humor : Perl-related Humor : Linus Torvalds Related humor : PseudoScience Related Humor : Networking Humor : Shell Humor : Financial Humor Bulletin, 2011 : Financial Humor Bulletin, 2012 : Financial Humor Bulletin, 2013 : Java Humor : Software Engineering Humor : Sun Solaris Related Humor : Education Humor : IBM Humor : Assembler-related Humor : VIM Humor : Computer Viruses Humor : Bright tomorrow is rescheduled to a day after tomorrow : Classic Computer Humor
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