Softpanorama

May the source be with you, but remember the KISS principle ;-)
Contents Bulletin Scripting in shell and Perl Network troubleshooting History Humor

Blog-based Steganography

News

See Also Recommended Books Recommended Links Tutorials FAQs and References
AES DES RC5 Differential Cryptanalysis Compression and security eBooks
Usenet Magazines University Courses History Humor Etc

Introduction

Parcially based on Wikipedia article

The word steganography is of Greek origin and means "concealed writing" from the Greek words steganos (στεγανός) meaning "covered or protected", and graphei (γραφή) meaning "writing".  The power of steganography is reflected in the proverb "To find a needle in a heap of hey" which means almost impossible task. The key idea is that secret messages are imbedded into "carrier" text. In case of text it is typically larger then the secret message. Crrie can be in different format too (archive, picture, TCP IP packets, etc). It is importna that  carrier  looks like completely "innocent" information: regular family photos or other images, scholarly articles, shopping lists, private letters or novels. One of the early methods was to use invisible ink with lines written between the visible lines of a private letter.  In the simplest form milk can be used. It revealed by heating the paper. 

Steganography hides the fact of existence of secret message in some open message or a set of message which can be in any feasible format (including pictures).  That provides perfect cover which allow to exchange of private messages under repressive regimes hell-bend of snooping citizen communications.  it also allow civil protest communications, although here the attention of government probably will be such that the algorithms will soon be revealed.

There are some basic definition:

Additional terminology

The value of steganography dramatically increased after Snowden revelation. It offer better security against a non-human adversary such as NSA data connection algorithms, ECHELON and similar systems then plain vanilla cryptography. If can be combined with cryptography -- in this case steganography messages is encrypted or encrypted message is imbedded in steganography set of messages ("carrier").

The first recorded use of the term was in 1499 by Johannes Trithemius in his Steganographia, a treatise on cryptography and steganography disguised as a book on magic.

The advantage of steganography over cryptography alone is that messages do not attract attention to themselves. Plainly visible encrypted messages arouse suspicion, and may in themselves be incriminating in countries where encryption is illegal. Therefore, whereas cryptography protects the contents of a message, steganography can be said to protect both messages and communicating parties.

Steganographic coding inside of a transport layer, such as a document file, image file, program or protocol can be arbitrarily complex.

It is not required that the payload is imbedded into a single file. It can be imbedded in multiple files, so that nothing can be recovered from a single file

Images and other media files are attractive carrier for  steganographic transmission because of their large size. As a simple example, payload can be put in ignored sections of a file, such as after the comments of the carrier file written in HTML. or by Making text the same color as the background in word processor documents and e-mails that are displayed as HTML, PDF or Word Files.

Blog-Steganography

"After Snowden" problem that your email message are no longer private is pretty annoying. Blogs can be used for exchange of private messages between individuals instead of regular email. Posts or comments can be fractionalized and the (possibly encrypted) pieces can be  added as comments, Javascript  programs on the blog post and/or HTML markup.

As most block allow comments in this case the selection of blogs and the method of hiding the message is the symmetric key that sender and recipient are shared; the carrier of the hidden message is the whole blogosphere.

Blog bases steganography  can be distributed In this case the payload is split between multiple carrier files in several different locations. Which make detection of the payload more difficult. see for  example, U.S. Patent 8,527,779 by cryptographer William Easttom (Chuck Easttom).

Using images as a carrier

Images present interesting opportunities as a carrier of private messages. it is probably the simplest steganography method that can be used with blogs. The larger the cover message is (in data content terms—number of bits) relative to the hidden message, the easier it is to hide the latter. For this reason, digital pictures (which contain large amounts of data) are used to hide messages on the Internet and on other communication media. It is not clear how commonly this is actually done but there are multiple program that also to perform this type oftrnasformation of the picture.  the obvious drawback is that this technique is well known and as such easily detectable. But required processing power is considerable. 

Requres that each party has its own blog on which it can post images. Most images should be "clean". Only specially marked should contain payload. Instead of static images a videostream can be used.

For example: a 24-bit bitmap will have 8 bits representing each of the three color values (red, green, and blue) at each pixel. If we consider just the blue there will be 28 different values of blue. The difference between 11111111 and 11111110 in the value for blue intensity is likely to be undetectable by the human eye. Therefore, the least significant bit can be used (more or less undetectably) for something else other than color information. If we do it with the green and the red as well we can get one letter of ASCII text for every three pixels.

In the message is encrypted that even detection of the carrier message allow just to retrieve crypto text.

Stated somewhat more formally, the objective for making steganographic encoding difficult to detect is to ensure that the changes to the carrier (the original signal) due to the injection of the payload (the signal to covertly embed) are visually (and ideally, statistically) negligible; that is to say, the changes are indistinguishable from the noise floor of the carrier. Any medium can be a carrier, but media with a large amount of redundant or compressible information are better suited.

From an information theoretical point of view, this means that the channel must have more capacity than the "surface" signal requires; that is, there must be redundancy. For a digital image, this may be noise from the imaging element; for digital audio, it may be noise from recording techniques or amplification equipment. In general, electronics that digitize an analog signal suffer from several noise sources such as thermal noise, flicker noise, and shot noise. This noise provides enough variation in the captured digital information that it can be exploited as a noise cover for hidden data. In addition, lossy compression schemes (such as JPEG) always introduce some error into the decompressed data; it is possible to exploit this for steganography use as well.

Steganography can be used for digital watermarking, where a message (being simply an identifier of the device and timestamp) is hidden in an image so that its source can be tracked or verified (for example, Coded Anti-Piracy), or even just to identify an image (as in the EURion constellation). Some color printers identify this way each page they print.

Some modern computer printers use steganography, including HP and Xerox brand color laser printers. These printers add tiny yellow dots to each page. The barely-visible dots contain encoded printer serial numbers and date and time stamps.[23]

When one considers that messages could be encrypted steganographically in e-mail messages, particularly e-mail spam, the notion of junk e-mail takes on a whole new light. Coupled with the "chaffing and winnowing" technique, a sender could get messages out and cover their tracks all at once.

Rumors about terrorists using steganography started first in the daily newspaper USA Today on February 5, 2001 in two articles titled "Terrorist instructions hidden online" and "Terror groups hide behind Web encryption". In July the same year, an article was titled even more precisely: "Militants wire Web with links to jihad". A citation from the article: "Lately, al-Qaeda operatives have been sending hundreds of encrypted messages that have been hidden in files on digital photographs on the auction site eBay.com". Other media worldwide cited these rumors many times, especially after the terrorist attack of 9/11, without ever showing proof. The Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera reported that an Al Qaeda cell which had been captured at the Via Quaranta mosque in Milan had pornographic images on their computers, and that these images had been used to hide secret messages (although no other Italian paper ever covered the story). The USA Today articles were written by veteran foreign correspondent Jack Kelley, who in 2004 was fired after allegations emerged that he had fabricated stories and sources.

In October 2001, the New York Times published an article claiming that al-Qaeda had used steganography to encode messages into images, and then transported these via e-mail and possibly via USENET to prepare and execute the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack. The Federal Plan for Cyber Security and Information Assurance Research and Development,[22] published in April 2006 makes the following statements:

"...immediate concerns also include the use of cyberspace for covert communications, particularly by terrorists but also by foreign intelligence services; espionage against sensitive but poorly defended data in government and industry systems; subversion by insiders, including vendors and contractors; criminal activity, primarily involving fraud and theft of financial or identity information, by hackers and organized crime groups..." (p. 9–10)

"International interest in R&D for steganography technologies and their commercialization and application has exploded in recent years. These technologies pose a potential threat to national security. Because steganography secretly embeds additional, and nearly undetectable, information content in digital products, the potential for covert dissemination of malicious software, mobile code, or information is great." (p. 41–42)

"The threat posed by steganography has been documented in numerous intelligence reports." (p. 42)
Moreover, an online "terrorist training manual", the "Technical Mujahid, a Training Manual for Jihadis" contained a section entitled "Covert Communications and Hiding Secrets Inside Images."[23]

By early 2002, a Cranfield University MSc thesis developed the first practical implementation of an online real-time Counter Terrorist Steganography Search Engine. This was designed to detect the most likely image steganography in transit and thereby provide UK Ministry of Defense Intelligence Staff a realistic approach to "narrowing the field", suggesting that interception capacity was never the difficulty but rather prioritizing the target media.

In 2010, the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that the Russian foreign intelligence service uses customized steganography software for embedding encrypted text messages inside image files for certain communications with "illegal agents" (agents under non-diplomatic cover) stationed abroad.

Using spam as a carrier

Spam in message forum is a tremendous problem which is extremely difficult to deal automatically. Spammers  usually a very persisted narrow focused on specific theme and can produce multiple variations of the same message to avoid detection by the spam filter. All those properties increase their value as a carrier. But it presents an interesting opportunity to to use "stream" of spam messages as a carrier. In this case "fake" spam messages can be automatically generated.

Using versioning as a carrier

As messages of the blog can be updates and the sequence of the updates along with history of updates can represent carrier. That actually include "fake" spam messages too.

Using imperfect mirror site as a carrier

If a mirror of the blog of Web site exists, "imperfect" mirror can be used as a carrier.  Imperfect quotes is another variation of the same theme. In this case any other site can be used an "imperfect mirror".

Aesop language

Developing Aesop language is another was to including payload into carrier. In this case the hidden meaning of the plain text is radically different from "surface meaning". Detection of such things are far beyond any power of modern AI and generally is outside computational capabilities of snooping agencies.  In a way they represent much more complex Turing test then traditional Turing test. 

The use of Aesop’s language may be viewed upon both in the context of culture and within the specific framework. The same message may have quite different meanings depending of cultural context and within the overall framework of social events which happen at the moment of creation of the message or can be understood based on common social experience of two communicating individuals.  For example "country shift" or 'fable shift" can not be detected with any automatic processing methods. In other words, it represent "social encoding" of the payload  and principal structural elements of such encoding are far beyond capabilities of modern computers.

In most case cases the hidden meaning of phrasing one’s thoughts involves either ideas which are contradicting and unacceptable for the political regime in question or ideas which are common for the whole of mankind. Most often it implies criticism of the given regime.

Any object or life phenomenon may acquire a special symbolic value in Aesop language and be understood as such by other recipent. It is common consent that the creation of symbols is one of the most ancient manifestations of the mental activity of humans and here essentially a special language is created. 

Reproducing methods used in printed steganography

Steganography is used by some modern printers, including HP and Xerox brand color laser printers. Tiny yellow dots are added to each page. The dots are barely visible and contain encoded printer serial numbers, as well as date and time stamps.  

Digital steganography output may be in the form of printed documents. A message, the plaintext, may be first encrypted by traditional means, producing a ciphertext. Then, an innocuous covertext is modified in some way so as to contain the ciphertext, resulting in the stegotext. For example, the letter size, spacing, typeface, or other characteristics of a covertext can be manipulated to carry the hidden message. Only a recipient who knows the technique used can recover the message and then decrypt it. Francis Bacon developed Bacon's cipher as such a technique.

The ciphertext produced by most digital steganography methods, however, is not printable. Traditional digital methods rely on perturbing noise in the channel file to hide the message, as such, the channel file must be transmitted to the recipient with no additional noise from the transmission. Printing introduces much noise in the ciphertext, generally rendering the message unrecoverable. There are techniques that address this limitation, one notable example is ASCII Art Steganography.

It is possible to use lookalike characters of the usual ASCII set to look normal, while really carrying extra bits of information. If the text is displayed correctly, there should be no visual difference from ordinary text. Some systems, however, may display the fonts differently, and the extra information would be easily spotted.

Alternately, hidden (e.g., control) characters, and redundant use of markup (e.g., empty bold, underline or italics) can add embedded within a body of text to hide information that wouldn't be visually apparent when displayed, but can be discovered by examining the document source.

HTML pages can contain code for extra blank spaces and tabs at the end of lines, as well as different colors, fonts and sizes, which will not be visible when displayed. A more trivial example is white text on a white background, which can be revealed by "selecting".

One such method is based on the non-printing Unicode characters Zero-Width Joiner (ZWJ) and Zero-Width Non-Joiner (ZWNJ).[18] These characters are used for joining and disjoining letters in Arabic, but can be used in Roman alphabets for hiding information because they have no meaning in Roman alphabets, and because they are "zero-width" and thus not displayed. The embedding of ZWJ in the cover-text represents “1” and the embedding of ZWNJ represents “0”. Groups of characters can be used to represent the letters A (giving it the code “0”, and thus represented by ZWNJ) to Z (giving it the code “1011”, and thus represented by ZWJ,ZWNJ,ZWJ,ZWJ). These character groups can be inserted between each character of the cover-text, thereby hiding a message.

Chaffing and winnowing

Steganography can be more subtle that just hiding message. It can be just  obscuring the "spectrum of the signal", for example frequency of letters in English text.  One simple way to obscure frequency of letters in English text is to inserting random first bits or letters into the plain text before encryption. 

Among some approaches:  

 

Countermeasures and detection

Detection of physical steganography is tremendously more difficult the detection of of crypto text. In this case the key unknown is what constitutes the carrier. Especailly in digital age where volumes of transmitted information are huge this amount to the attempt to fight the needle in a heap of hey.

For example if the suspicion is that paper is the carrier, detection requires careful and complex physical examination, including the use of magnification, chemical analysis, ultraviolet light, etc. It is an expecsive and very time-consuming process with obvious resource implications.

However, in the past it was feasible to screen mail of certain suspected individuals or institutions, such as prisons or prisoner-of-war (POW) camps. During World War II, a technology used to ease monitoring of POW mail was specially treated paper that would reveal invisible ink. An article in the June 24, 1948 issue of Paper Trade Journal by the Technical Director of the United States Government Printing Office, Morris S. Kantrowitz, describes in general terms the development of this paper, three prototypes of which were named Sensicoat, Anilith, and Coatalith paper. These were for the manufacture of post cards and stationery to be given to German prisoners of war in the US and Canada.

If POWs tried to write a hidden message the special paper would render it visible. At least two US patents were granted related to this technology, one to Mr. Kantrowitz, No. 2,515,232, "Water-Detecting paper and Water-Detecting Coating Composition Therefor", patented July 18, 1950, and an earlier one, "Moisture-Sensitive Paper and the Manufacture Thereof", No. 2,445,586, patented July 20, 1948. A similar strategy is to issue prisoners with writing paper ruled with a water-soluble ink that "runs" when in contact with a water-based invisible ink.

In computing, detection of steganographically encoded packages is called steganalysis. The simplest method to detect modified files, however, is to compare them to known originals, which is possible in case the picture is in public domain.  For example, to detect information being moved through the graphics on a website, an analyst can maintain known-clean copies of these materials and compare them against the current contents of the site. The differences, assuming the carrier is the same, will compose the payload.

In general, using extremely high compression rate makes steganography difficult, but not impossible. While compression errors provide a hiding place for data, high compression reduces the amount of data available to hide the payload in, raising the encoding density and facilitating easier detection (in the extreme case, even by casual observation).

  Historic notes

Steganography has been widely used, including in recent historical times and the present day. Possible permutations are endless and known examples include:

Modern steganography entered the world in 1985 with the advent of the personal computer being applied to classical steganography problems. Development following that was slow, but has since taken off, going by the number of "stego" programs available. Early examples included:

 


Top Visited
Switchboard
Latest
Past week
Past month

NEWS CONTENTS

Old News ;-)

[Mar 15, 2016] Modern File and Data Structures Facilitate Data Hiding and Information Exfiltration

CSIAC

The complexity and flexibility that is built into modern file and data structures provide opportunities for criminals or worse to hide, exfiltrate and covertly communicate data. This webinar will discuss file / data structure vulnerabilities and exploits. We will also discuss mitigating strategies that will help to close the gaps now and we will discuss future approaches to data and file structures that could systemically reduce the threat.

Presenter:

Chet Hosmer
Chet Hosmer is the Chief Scientist & Sr. Vice President at and a co-founder of WetStone Technologies, Inc. Chet has been researching and developing technology and training surrounding data hiding, steganography and watermarking for over a decade. He has made numerous appearances to discuss the threat steganography poses including National Public Radio's Kojo Nnamdi show, ABC's Primetime Thursday, NHK Japan, CrimeCrime TechTV and ABC News Australia. He has also been a frequent contributor to technical and news stories relating to steganography and has been interviewed and quoted by IEEE, The New York Times, The Washington Post, Government Computer News, Salon.com and Wired Magazine. Chet also serves as a visiting professor at Utica College where he teaches in the Cybersecurity Graduate program. His recent book "Data Hiding, Exposing Concealed Data in Multimedia, Operating Systems, Mobile Devices and Network Protocols was published by Syngress and released in January of 2013 and is available at Amazon ISBN: 978-1597497435

[Feb 24 2003 ] Program Hides Secret Messages in Executables By Kevin Poulsen

I doubt that this is promising as described, but something along those lines (with predefined set of equivalencies) can be developed further. Consider instructions equivalencies as some kind of bit mask that can be applied to any of the program strings
Feb 24 2003 | SecurityFocus

Netizens with extreme privacy needs got a new tool for their cyber utility belts recently with the release of an application that lets users hide secret messages in virtually any executable computer program, without changing the program's size or affecting its operation.

The tool is called "Hydan," an old English word for the act of hiding something, and it's part of a research project by Columbia University computer science masters student Rakan El-Khalil, who showed off the program to a small group of open-source programmers and hackers gathered at the second annual CodeCon conference in San Francisco on Sunday.

Hydan is a novel development in the field of steganography -- the science of burying secret messages in seemingly innocuous content. Popular stego programs operate on image and music files, where a secret missive can be hidden without altering the content enough to be perceived by human senses. But because they contain instructions for a computer's processor, executable files are less forgiving of tampering. Improperly changing a single bit of executable code can render an application completely unusable.

El-Khalil's research focused on redundancies in the Intel x86 instruction set -- places where at least two different instructions are effectively the same. Each choice between two redundant options can represent a single bit of data. "The problem with program binaries is there is just not a lot of redundancy in them," said El-Khalil.

He found some of that useful redundancy in the instructions that tell the computer to add or subtract.

A computer instruction to add the number 50 to another value, for example, can be replaced with an instruction to subtract the number -50 instead. Mathematically, the instructions are the same. In choosing between the two, a stego program can get one bit of covert storage out of each addition or subtraction operation in the executable -- without changing the way the application runs, or adding a single byte to its size. "If we use a scenario in which addition is zero, and subtraction is one, we can just go through and flip them as needed," El-Khalil explained.

El-Khalil concedes that the method is imperfect -- an application that's been impressed with a secret message has considerably more "negative subtractions" than an unadulterated program, making it easy to pick out through a statistical analysis. Hydan could also break programs that are self-modifying or employ other unconventional techniques. And it's less efficient than stego programs for image and sound files: good steganography for a JPEG file can hide one byte of storage in 17 bytes of image, while Hydan's ratio is one byte of storage to 150 bytes of code.

Future versions of Hydan will boost that capacity by finding different places to code data, such as in the order of a program's functions, and the order in which arguments are passed to those functions. For now, the application is still powerful enough to secretly stash the United States Constitution and the Declaration of Independence in a single copy of Microsoft Word.

Beyond the covert uses, the technology could be used to attach a digital signature to an application, or to embed an executable with a virtual watermark.

Cryptography, Encryption and Stenography

Recommended Links

Softpanorama hot topic of the month

Softpanorama Recommended

Papers

CHACS Publications for 2002 Moskowitz, Ira S., Neil F. Johnson, and Michael Jacobs, "A Detection Study of an NRL Steganographic Method", NRL/MR/554002-8635, August 16, 2002. PDF

For a bound, easier to read, copy of this please contact:

Ms. L. Norton, Library---Code 5225, NRL, Washington, DC 20375

In this report we analyze in detail a method of image steganography developed by NRL. Our conclusion is that this method of steganography is undetectable by current pragmatic statistical stego detection techniques, primarily because it alters a very small number of pixels. The small size of the embedded message is the key to the lack of detection, provided that a non-anomalous cover image is used.

Newman, Richard E., Ira S. Moskowitz, LiWu Chang, and Murali M. Brahmadesam, "A Steganographic Embedding Undetectable by JPEG Compatibility Steganalysis", Proc. Information Hiding 2002, 7-9 October 2002, (final proceedings will be published by Springer, LNCS series, ed. F.A.P. Petitcolas). PDF

Steganography and steganalysis of digital images is a cat-and-mouse game. In recent work, Fridrich, Goljan and Du introduced a method that is surprisingly accurate at determining if bitmap images that originated as JPEG files have been altered (and even specifying where and how they were altered), even if only a single bit has been changed. However, steganographic embeddings that encode embedded data in the JPEG coefficients are not detectable by their JPEG compatibility steganalysis. This paper describes a steganographic method that encodes the embedded data in the spatial domain, yet cannot be detected by their steganalysis mechanism. Furthermore, we claim that our method can also be used as a steganographic method on files stored in JPEG format. The method described herein uses a novel, topological approach to embedding. The paper also outlines some extensions to the proposed embedding method.

Moskowitz, Ira S., Garth E. Longdon and LiWu Chang, "A New Paradigm Hidden in Steganography". Proceedings, New Security Paradigms Workshop, Sept. 2000, Ballycotton, Co. Cork, Ireland. Also appears in "The Privacy Papers," ed. R. Herold, Auerbach Press, 2001. PostScript, PDF

We discuss how steganography, in contrast to similar disciplines, requires a new paradigm based upon discontinuities and the absence of noise as a detection deterrent.

Links

CHACS Publications for 2002 Moskowitz, Ira S., Neil F. Johnson, and Michael Jacobs, "A Detection Study of an NRL Steganographic Method", NRL/MR/554002-8635, August 16, 2002. PDF

 

For a bound, easier to read, copy of this please contact:

Ms. L. Norton, Library---Code 5225, NRL, Washington, DC 20375

In this report we analyze in detail a method of image steganography developed by NRL. Our conclusion is that this method of steganography is undetectable by current pragmatic statistical stego detection techniques, primarily because it alters a very small number of pixels. The small size of the embedded message is the key to the lack of detection, provided that a non-anomalous cover image is used.

Newman, Richard E., Ira S. Moskowitz, LiWu Chang, and Murali M. Brahmadesam, "A Steganographic Embedding Undetectable by JPEG Compatibility Steganalysis", Proc. Information Hiding 2002, 7-9 October 2002, (final proceedings will be published by Springer, LNCS series, ed. F.A.P. Petitcolas). PDF

Steganography and steganalysis of digital images is a cat-and-mouse game. In recent work, Fridrich, Goljan and Du introduced a method that is surprisingly accurate at determining if bitmap images that originated as JPEG files have been altered (and even specifying where and how they were altered), even if only a single bit has been changed. However, steganographic embeddings that encode embedded data in the JPEG coefficients are not detectable by their JPEG compatibility steganalysis. This paper describes a steganographic method that encodes the embedded data in the spatial domain, yet cannot be detected by their steganalysis mechanism. Furthermore, we claim that our method can also be used as a steganographic method on files stored in JPEG format. The method described herein uses a novel, topological approach to embedding. The paper also outlines some extensions to the proposed embedding method.

Moskowitz, Ira S., Garth E. Longdon and LiWu Chang, "A New Paradigm Hidden in Steganography". Proceedings, New Security Paradigms Workshop, Sept. 2000, Ballycotton, Co. Cork, Ireland. Also appears in "The Privacy Papers," ed. R. Herold, Auerbach Press, 2001. PostScript, PDF

We discuss how steganography, in contrast to similar disciplines, requires a new paradigm based upon discontinuities and the absence of noise as a detection deterrent.

Recommended Links

Softpanorama hot topic of the month

Softpanorama Recommended



Etc

FAIR USE NOTICE This site contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available in our efforts to advance understanding of environmental, political, human rights, economic, democracy, scientific, and social justice issues, etc. We believe this constitutes a 'fair use' of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit exclusivly for research and educational purposes.   If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use', you must obtain permission from the copyright owner. 

ABUSE: IPs or network segments from which we detect a stream of probes might be blocked for no less then 90 days. Multiple types of probes increase this period.  

Society

Groupthink : Two Party System as Polyarchy : Corruption of Regulators : Bureaucracies : Understanding Micromanagers and Control Freaks : Toxic Managers :   Harvard Mafia : Diplomatic Communication : Surviving a Bad Performance Review : Insufficient Retirement Funds as Immanent Problem of Neoliberal Regime : PseudoScience : Who Rules America : Neoliberalism  : The Iron Law of Oligarchy : Libertarian Philosophy

Quotes

War and Peace : Skeptical Finance : John Kenneth Galbraith :Talleyrand : Oscar Wilde : Otto Von Bismarck : Keynes : George Carlin : Skeptics : Propaganda  : SE quotes : Language Design and Programming Quotes : Random IT-related quotesSomerset Maugham : Marcus Aurelius : Kurt Vonnegut : Eric Hoffer : Winston Churchill : Napoleon Bonaparte : Ambrose BierceBernard Shaw : Mark Twain Quotes

Bulletin:

Vol 25, No.12 (December, 2013) Rational Fools vs. Efficient Crooks The efficient markets hypothesis : Political Skeptic Bulletin, 2013 : Unemployment Bulletin, 2010 :  Vol 23, No.10 (October, 2011) An observation about corporate security departments : Slightly Skeptical Euromaydan Chronicles, June 2014 : Greenspan legacy bulletin, 2008 : Vol 25, No.10 (October, 2013) Cryptolocker Trojan (Win32/Crilock.A) : Vol 25, No.08 (August, 2013) Cloud providers as intelligence collection hubs : Financial Humor Bulletin, 2010 : Inequality Bulletin, 2009 : Financial Humor Bulletin, 2008 : Copyleft Problems Bulletin, 2004 : Financial Humor Bulletin, 2011 : Energy Bulletin, 2010 : Malware Protection Bulletin, 2010 : Vol 26, No.1 (January, 2013) Object-Oriented Cult : Political Skeptic Bulletin, 2011 : Vol 23, No.11 (November, 2011) Softpanorama classification of sysadmin horror stories : Vol 25, No.05 (May, 2013) Corporate bullshit as a communication method  : Vol 25, No.06 (June, 2013) A Note on the Relationship of Brooks Law and Conway Law

History:

Fifty glorious years (1950-2000): the triumph of the US computer engineering : Donald Knuth : TAoCP and its Influence of Computer Science : Richard Stallman : Linus Torvalds  : Larry Wall  : John K. Ousterhout : CTSS : Multix OS Unix History : Unix shell history : VI editor : History of pipes concept : Solaris : MS DOSProgramming Languages History : PL/1 : Simula 67 : C : History of GCC developmentScripting Languages : Perl history   : OS History : Mail : DNS : SSH : CPU Instruction Sets : SPARC systems 1987-2006 : Norton Commander : Norton Utilities : Norton Ghost : Frontpage history : Malware Defense History : GNU Screen : OSS early history

Classic books:

The Peter Principle : Parkinson Law : 1984 : The Mythical Man-MonthHow to Solve It by George Polya : The Art of Computer Programming : The Elements of Programming Style : The Unix Hater’s Handbook : The Jargon file : The True Believer : Programming Pearls : The Good Soldier Svejk : The Power Elite

Most popular humor pages:

Manifest of the Softpanorama IT Slacker Society : Ten Commandments of the IT Slackers Society : Computer Humor Collection : BSD Logo Story : The Cuckoo's Egg : IT Slang : C++ Humor : ARE YOU A BBS ADDICT? : The Perl Purity Test : Object oriented programmers of all nations : Financial Humor : Financial Humor Bulletin, 2008 : Financial Humor Bulletin, 2010 : The Most Comprehensive Collection of Editor-related Humor : Programming Language Humor : Goldman Sachs related humor : Greenspan humor : C Humor : Scripting Humor : Real Programmers Humor : Web Humor : GPL-related Humor : OFM Humor : Politically Incorrect Humor : IDS Humor : "Linux Sucks" Humor : Russian Musical Humor : Best Russian Programmer Humor : Microsoft plans to buy Catholic Church : Richard Stallman Related Humor : Admin Humor : Perl-related Humor : Linus Torvalds Related humor : PseudoScience Related Humor : Networking Humor : Shell Humor : Financial Humor Bulletin, 2011 : Financial Humor Bulletin, 2012 : Financial Humor Bulletin, 2013 : Java Humor : Software Engineering Humor : Sun Solaris Related Humor : Education Humor : IBM Humor : Assembler-related Humor : VIM Humor : Computer Viruses Humor : Bright tomorrow is rescheduled to a day after tomorrow : Classic Computer Humor

The Last but not Least


Copyright © 1996-2016 by Dr. Nikolai Bezroukov. www.softpanorama.org was created as a service to the UN Sustainable Development Networking Programme (SDNP) in the author free time. This document is an industrial compilation designed and created exclusively for educational use and is distributed under the Softpanorama Content License.

The site uses AdSense so you need to be aware of Google privacy policy. You you do not want to be tracked by Google please disable Javascript for this site. This site is perfectly usable without Javascript.

Original materials copyright belong to respective owners. Quotes are made for educational purposes only in compliance with the fair use doctrine.

FAIR USE NOTICE This site contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available to advance understanding of computer science, IT technology, economic, scientific, and social issues. We believe this constitutes a 'fair use' of any such copyrighted material as provided by section 107 of the US Copyright Law according to which such material can be distributed without profit exclusively for research and educational purposes.

This is a Spartan WHYFF (We Help You For Free) site written by people for whom English is not a native language. Grammar and spelling errors should be expected. The site contain some broken links as it develops like a living tree...

You can use PayPal to make a contribution, supporting development of this site and speed up access. In case softpanorama.org is down you can use the at softpanorama.info

Disclaimer:

The statements, views and opinions presented on this web page are those of the author (or referenced source) and are not endorsed by, nor do they necessarily reflect, the opinions of the author present and former employers, SDNP or any other organization the author may be associated with. We do not warrant the correctness of the information provided or its fitness for any purpose.

Last modified: June, 04, 2016