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Softpanorama
(slightly skeptical)
Open Source Software Educational Society |
May the
source be with you,
but remember the KISS principle ;-)
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Groupthink
"Those who can make you believe absurdities
can make you commit atrocities."--Voltaire
"It is dangerous to be right in matters on which the established
authorities are wrong."
Voltaire, 1694-1778
"Once spirit was God, then it became man, and now it is even becoming
mob."
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche
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Etymology: 1group + -think (as in
doublethink): a pattern of thought characterized by self-deception, forced manufacture
of consent, and conformity to group values and ethics
Groupthink, a term coined by social psychologist Irving Janis (1972), occurs
when a group or individual makes faulty decisions because
group pressures lead to a deterioration of “mental efficiency, reality testing,
and moral judgment” (p. 9).
In Europe this phenomenon is mainly called conformism.
(See famous
Asch conformity experiments, were people frequently followed the majority judgment,
even when the majority was wrong.).
Groupthink is the phenomenon which occurs when group members become so focused
on achieving concurrence that the search for consensus overrides any realistic assessment
of deviant or unpopular views. It represents a deterioration in an individual's
mental efficiency and reality testing as a result of group pressures.
Groups affected by groupthink ignore alternatives and tend to take irrational
actions. A group is especially vulnerable to groupthink when the group is
insulated from outside opinions. Highly cohesive groups are much more likely to
engage in groupthink
- Janis, Irving L. (1972). Victims of Groupthink. New York:
Houghton Mifflin.
- Janis, Irving L. (1982). Groupthink: Psychological Studies of
Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Second Edition. New York: Houghton
Mifflin.
Groupthink
Explanation of Theory: The result when group cohesion leads all members
of the group to abandon realistic evaluation of the situation and follow the
corporate group ideal.
Theorists:
Irving Janis
Date:
1972
Primary Article:
Janis, I. L, (1972). Victims of Groupthink: A psychological study of foreign-policy
decisions and fiascoes (2nd edition). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Individual
Interpretations:
Groupthink is a theory that was developed in hindsight. All of the examples
given in the original theory were offered post hoc which is problematic.
Since its inception it has been revisted and studies have raised viable questions
about the validity of the assumptions made in groupthink.
Metatheoretical
Assumptions:
Being a Scientific theory the following metatheoretical assumption should be
advanced.
Ontological
Assumptions:
Scientific research suggest that human nature is deterministic. Humans
do
not have control what they do.
Epistemological
Assumptions:
Scientific research suggests that there is one truth, or big T truth.
Axiological
Assumptions:
Research should not be value laden. Research offers objective results.
Critique:
Being a Scientific theory it should be critiqued using Chaffee & Berger's criteria.
Explanatory Power - Groupthink offers a concrete definition of what will
happen when groups become cohesive.
Predictive Power -Groupthink offers a explanation that if a group becomes cohesive
the group will make bad decisions.
Parsimony -Groupthink is a very simple theory that states a cohesiveness within
a group will lead to poor decision making in the group.
Falsifiablity - Groupthink is a little short in this category. There were
no original criteria for groupthink so it is hard to test. However, some
researchers have attempted to develop a scale to test groupthink.
Internal Consistency - Groupthink is argued by many researchers. Some
agree but new research suggests that groupthink should be re-developed because
it is not matching the current research on effective decision-making and cohesiveness.
Heuristic Provocativeness - There are several new hypothesis that can be offered
about what happens in cohesive groups. Researchers are working on new
ideas as we speak.
Organizing Power - A major drawback on groupthink is there was never a specific
set of criteria of what groupthink is so that it could be tested. There
were only symptoms to be interrupted by the researcher looking a group's decision.
Ideas and
Implications:
It is very important to understand groupthink because of the implications of
groups in today's society. We need to know why and how groups make bad
decisions and groupthink offers one explanation. However the theory of
groupthink should be carefully examined before it is offered as the sole truth
of what happens in groups.
Example:
The Abbaline Paradox
Relevant
Research:
Hart, P.T. (1998). Preventing Groupthink Revisited: Evaluating
and Reforming Groups in Government. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 73, 306-326.
Rothwell, J. D. (1998). In mixed company:
Small group communication. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace.
Schafer, M. & Crichlow, S. (1996). Antecedents of
groupthink: a quantitative
study. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40, 415-435
Whyte, G. (1998). Recasting Janis's Groupthink Model:
The Key Role of Collective Efficacy in Decision Fiascoes. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73, 185-209
Location
in Eight (8) Primary Communication Theory Textbooks:
Anderson, R., & Ross,
V. (1998). Questions of communication: A practical
introduction to theory (2nd ed.). New York: St. Martin's Press.
N/A
Cragan, J. F., & Shields, D.C. (1998). Understanding communication theory:
The communicative forces for human action. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
N/A
Griffin, E. (2000). A first look at communication theory (4th ed.). Boston,
MA: McGraw-Hill. N/A
Griffin, E. (1997). A first look at communication theory (3rd ed.). New
York: McGraw-Hill. 231-
Infante, D. A., Rancer, A. S., & Womack, D. F. (1997). Building communication
theory (3rd ed.). Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press. N/A
Littlejohn, S. W. (1999). Theories of human communication (6th ed). Belmont,
CA: Wadsworth. N/A
West, R., & Turner, L. H. (2000). Introducing communication theory: Analysis
and application. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield. N/A
Wood, J. T. (1997). Communication theories in action: An introduction.
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. N/A
The Challenger space shuttle explosion. The Bay of Pigs invasion. The Korean
War debacle (Janis 1-28). These are examples of situations where group communication
failed. Group communication involves a shared identity among three or more people,
a considerable amount of interaction among these people, and a high level
of interdependence between everyone involved (Trenholm 196-97). It is
essential to understand group dynamics for a variety of reasons. Everyone participates
in groups throughout the course of a lifetime, and these groups are often very
goal-oriented. The business community, non-profit organizations, and town governments
all use groups to make decisions. Sometimes a condition known as Groupthink
can occur in groups that are extremely task-oriented and goal-driven. Groupthink
is as "a mode of thinking people engage in when cohesiveness is high" (Blumberg
and Golembiewski 134). Groupthink leads to poor decision making and results
in a lack of creativity. Although Groupthink has been studied extensively, many
people are unaware of its dynamics and the consequences that they might induce.
This paper was designed to raise awareness about Groupthink and to provide some
suggestions that can help task-oriented groups avoid this condition. To understand
Groupthink it is essential to have a basic familiarity with group communication
dynamics. Once this is accomplished some symptoms of Groupthink will be explored
and some solutions will be offered.
Lots of work has been done on the subject of Groupthink, but the most authoritative
documentation on the subject can be discovered in the works of the founder of
the concept, Irving Janis. Janis, in his book Groupthink, defines the terms
involved and presents examples. Beyond Groupthink is a text written by Eric
Stern et al. that deals with Groupthink in small groups. The authors believe
that a certain amount of Groupthink can be beneficial in small groups. Articles
involving Groupthink have also appeared in the Wall Street Journal and various
other publications.
Goal-oriented groups consist of people with complementary skills who are
committed to a common purpose, have specific performance goals, share a common
working approach, and hold mutual accountability (Wertheim 2). These types of
groups are used when there are complex problems to be solved, important situations
to work through, or uncertain conditions. Groups function best when there are
no immediate time pressures (Wertheim 2). Groups are successful because the
group members bring diverse ideas, the collective knowledge of everyone is significant,
and groups tend to be focused (Wertheim 2). There are certain situations which
call for the use of groups. Groups can be beneficial when communication between
departments is necessary in a business setting or when the consent of many people
is required (Wertheim 3). Individuals can also benefit from group participation.
Many people who work in groups are able to learn new skills, take risks, get
feedback, and discover personal strengths and weaknesses (Wertheim 3).
Groups must accomplish tasks that individuals cannot. This is the primary
function of groups. Effective groups consist of committed members who are willing
to take accountability for the actions of the group (Wertheim 3-4). At Northeastern
University an academic program has been developed to facilitate group communication.
The University believes that effective groups are characterized by a sense of
urgency and direction, a following of a set of rules, understanding of what
the problem or issue is that needs to be solved, a shared sense of leadership,
an ability to brainstorm, and a cohesive climate (Wertheim 4). Effective groups
need to have clear goals, mutual trust among all participants, accountability
shared by everyone, external support, and training (Wertheim 4-5).
Irving Janis did lots of work in the area of group communication. He wondered
why intelligent groups of people sometimes made decisions that led to disastrous
results. Janis focused on the political arena. He studied The Bay of Pigs conflict,
The Korean War, Pearl Harbor, The conflict in Vietnam, The Cuban Missile Crisis,
makings of The Marshall Plan, and Watergate (Janis 9-13). Janis was puzzled
by the inability of very intelligent people to make sound decisions. His answer
was a condition he termed Groupthink.
Janis defines Groupthink as a "a quick and easy way to refer to a mode of
thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group,
when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically
appraise alternative courses of action" (Janis 9). Janis further states that
"Groupthink refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing,
and moral judgment that results from in-group pressures" (Janis 9). Groupthink
can lead to bad judgments and decisions being made. It serves as a simple way
to deal with difficult issues.
The symptoms of Groupthink are clear. The "illusion of invulnerability" happens
when a group thinks that they cannot go wrong. Confidence among the members
of the group is remarkably high and is reflected in the decisions that they
make (Keil 1). A "belief in inherent morality of the group" occurs when the
group thinks tremendously of their morality. The group believes that it is doing
the right thing in all circumstances. "Collective rationalization" is another
symptom of Groupthink. Groups who experience this believe that nothing can be
wrong with their plan even if there is significant evidence to prove otherwise
(Keil 2). A lack of creativity and a disregard for others' options is a characteristic
of groups with "out-group stereotypes." Groups often pay little attention to
what outsiders have to say, and this can be detrimental (Keil 2). "Self-censorship"
occurs when group members don't share their ideas with the rest of the group
because of fear of being rejected (Keil 2). The "illusion of unanimity" explains
that silence can often be interpreted as acceptance. All of these are symptoms
of Groupthink. If one or more of these are commonplace in a particular group,
change must occur.
Janis offers many suggestion to help prevent Groupthink. An easy answer is
to put one person in charge of making all decisions and dealing with problems.
This is not desirable in most cases, however (Janis 260-61). Groups are often
able to accomplish tasks more rapidly and precisely than individuals can (Cartwright
and Zander 56-57). The distribution of power in a group usually assures that
no single person is able to take control. The plan of one person is more likely
to be flawed than the plan of a group. More people inputting their opinion will
help the group formulate a creative and complete plan.
One way of preventing Groupthink is to make each member of the group a "critical
evaluator" (Janis 262). Group members will attempt to find problems in group
solutions by evaluating them individually. The leader must accept criticism
if this is to work (Janis 262). But making each member of the group analyze
solutions individually is problematic. Group members can spend too much time
debating when there is an important deadline. Feelings can be hurt when the
ideas of individual group members are criticized. Some group members may not
have the skills to think critically about the presented solutions (Janis 262-63).
Leaders who assign tasks to a group must be impartial and must not lead the
group to believe that a certain outcome is expected (Janis 263). Group members
will not attempt to conform with beliefs of the leadership if they are unsure
of what the leader wants. Problems arise because the leader often feels that
there is no centralized control within the group.
Many different groups can work on the same problem under separate leaders
(Janis 264). Every group would come up with different ideas, and the pressure
to conform is not as great. In some instances security can be a problem. Information
is more likely to leak out if more people are aware of the information. Problems
also arise when a group assumes that another group will examine the pieces to
the solution that have been missed. It is much easier to allow someone else
to complete the task (Janis 264-65). When only one group is working on a particular
problem this doesn't happen.
Groups should divide into two or more subgroups occasionally (Janis 265).
Each group should be led by a different chairperson. Both groups can eventually
come together and discuss ideas. Groups that do this are less likely to be locked
into one solution.
Outside experts can be brought in to observe the group functioning (Janis
266). The experts should have the ability to question the decisions of the group.
The experts need to be very qualified and skilled in their ability to sort through
and analyze solutions of the group. The experts must also be able to criticize
the group in a fashion that will not turn the group away from the expert. Good
communication skills are essential. It is important that experts become a part
of the group before a general consensus is reached among all group members (Janis
266).
Every group should include a specific member who has the job of playing "devil's
advocate." This person should seriously question much of what the group members
say. The "devil's advocate" must be willing to vocally share his ideas with
the rest of the group (Janis 267). This strategy will force the group to take
a second look at every decision that is made. The "devil's advocate" of the
group must be taken seriously and be allowed to speak at will if this strategy
is to be effective.
Having been a part of many groups myself, I believe that the best way to
avoid Groupthink is to have an understanding and awareness of it. Groups that
constantly question decisions are likely to never encounter Groupthink. Groups
are useful and necessary in many situations. They often solve problems that
individuals cannot. Groupthink can limit the value of groups. Groupthink problems
can be recognized by identifying a set of characteristics including an illusion
of invulnerability, self censorship, and others. Janis recommends many strategies
for avoiding Groupthink. Groups can assign the role of critical evaluator to
each member, divide into subgroups, invite experts to sit in on meetings, and
so on. Groupthink is a problem that can have destructive consequences. If group
members are aware of Groupthink and are constantly checking for it the damaging
effects of this condition can be avoided.
Back to
essays
Notes:
- Those pages are written by people for whom English is not a
native language. Some amount of grammar and spelling errors
should be expected.
- This is a Spartan WHYFF (We Help You For Free) site. It
cannot replace the best teachers and
the
best books.
- The site contain some obsolete pages as it develops like a
living tree... Some links on older pages
are broken. Please
try to use Google, Open directory, etc. to find a replacement link
(see
HOWTO search the WEB for details).
We would appreciate if you can
mail us a correct link.
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"Too nice" people serve as a natural feeding ground for
corporate sociopaths.
- Paperback: 288 pages
- Publisher: Grand Central Publishing; Reprint edition (November 1,
2000)
- Language: English
- ISBN-13: 978-0446673860
- Product Dimensions: 7.9 x 5.1 x 0.8 inches
Niceness Mistakes-For Good!, June 11, 2003 By
Ilaxi S. Patel "Editor, kidsfreesouls.com &
A... (India) -
See all my reviewsHow oft we create a wave to spell trouble with our
own perfections being true and honest with good faith and intentions? We take
on too much not saying what we want and that's exactly what the book reveals
- the niceness mistakes that 'Damage' us! Unconsciously, we have planted strong
messages in the back of our minds and with good intentions by our mentors, follow
the moral code of conducts in life. Be good, be nice, be cool, share and care,
don't be selfish, be reasonable, don't hurt others, help friends, say yes and
so on. In real, trying to reach perfection and taking on too much lead us to
exhaustion and sooner or later the ship of our life start sinking. The author
gives an insight to the nine unconscious mistakes we often make daily and helps
us correct them and pulls a person out of frustration and stress.
In not saying what you want and taking on too much, it leads to suppressed
anger. Robinson provides healthy tips to express anger to orchestrate a balanced
life. Life itself is like riding a bike up and down roads that are bumpy, curvy,
hilly while juggling bananas, balloons and bowling balls says Robinson and so
this is when you have a fall, life needs balancing
back to pedal and steer with too much/too little, too rational/too emotional,
to fast/too slow, too cautious/too reckless, too strong/too weak, etc. and remain
upright empowering to get what you need and deserve. Irony is,
sometimes our niceness betrays us and this book is a key to understanding our
mistakes and bring about a 'change' in us. Robinson makes us a nicer person
making one realise the mistakes, why we make and how to give up.
In doing so, Robinson guides in:
1. Liberating from the bondage of other's expectations
2. Saying no and saving work overloads
3. Telling what we want and analyze what we receive is worth or not
4. Express anger that heal and maintain relationships too.
5. Face irrationality and criticism
6. Tell truth to friends when they fail us
7. Care for others but do no burden own trying to run their lives.
8. In pain and grief, feel competent enough
A change is always welcome even for the nice to be nicer and avoid the mistakes
that we keep making out of the blue. Our good intentions turn out to be damn-in-way
for others who often misunderstand or shrug off not appreciating your worth
as human being. This book is indeed a gem collection for every person who has
learned to live being 'Nice' and remain being so without being emotionally hung
up sometimes. Good Pick!
Former title was better., April 8, 2007
By
Geoffrey J. Barnes
"CyberBronco" (Miami, FL
United States)
The former title of this book was Good Intentions. From the information I gathered
in the first few pages it was first published in 1997. I am not sure if that
refers to the first publication under the current title or the previous one.
I say that because the text feels more dated than just 10 years old.
I bought this book at Borders. The title caught my eye and a scan of the first
few lines of each chapter confirmed I would like this book. As someone who is
always accused of being too nice a guy and winding up burned more than once
by relationships and employers, I thought I was on to something! Unfortunately
I feel burned again by being naive enough to buy this book. There are those
reading this that will say I should have done my homework first before making
a purchase. Well, I'm sorry but I am not one of those jerks who sits in Barnes
and Noble all day, taking up space and breaking in the backs of books I never
intend to purchase. I wish those chairs would run a few megawatts of electricity
through them every 10 minutes to get those creepy people out of the stores.
They never buy anything and they smell bad! When my cell phone rings in the
store, they have the nerve to "Shush" me. Hey people! This is a retail establishment!
Buy something or move back into the library!
To give an example of what I am referring to in this book go to page 201, Mistake
#8: Rescuing Others. The first page gives an example of a guy with a nephew
who is having trouble staying in school or keeping a job. This is actually the
chapter that made me buy the book. After getting a few pages into the chapter
you realize they are only referring to people who try to rescue addicts and
nothing else. My nephew is not an addict, but he otherwise fits the description
in the example. Too bad this book didn't stick to its original title: Good Intentions.
It is a better description of what is being preached here.
Mistake #7 is called Giving Advice. It tells you to never give advice, and lists
several reasons why you should not. Ironically advice is what this book is based
upon. The author is giving all of us poor "Nice" guys advice.
I believe the author had "good intentions" when he wrote this book. I believe
the publisher had a great money making idea when he re-released this book under
its new title.
What
is Mobbing? Workplace Mobbing in Academe (2004).
Budget Cuts Are Not the Only Way Workers Are Forced from Jobs: Workplace
Abuse
“The mobbing syndrome is a malicious attempt to force a person out of
the workplace through unjustified accusations, humiliation, general
harassment, emotional abuse, and/or terror. “It is a ‘ganging up’ by
the leader(s) - organization, superior, co-worker, or subordinate - who rallies
others into systematic and frequent ‘mob-like’ behavior.“Because
the organization ignores, condones, or even instigates the behavior, it can
be said that the victim, seemingly helpless against the powerful and
many, is indeed ‘mobbed.’ The result is always injury - physical or mental
distress or illness and social misery and, most often, expulsion from the
workplace.”
-Mobbing: Emotional Abuse in the American Workplace, by Davenport,
Schwartz, and Elliott, 1999.
When a budget crisis hits a large institution, certain workers often seem to
be treated as though they are“expendable,” and are often the first forced
out. But this is not the only manner in which workers are driven out of the
workplace. Mobbing has been recognized for many years in
Europe, and it is also beginning to be identified as a serious workplace
problem in the United States. The authors above go on to say, “Mobbing
is an emotional assault. Through innuendo, rumors, and public discrediting,
a hostile environment is created in which one individual gathers others
to willingly, or unwillingly participate in continuous malevolent actions to
force a person out of the workplace.”“These actions
escalate into abusive and terrorizing behavior. The victim feels increasingly
helpless when the organization does not put a stop to the behavior or
may even plan or condone it... Frequently productivity is affected...
Resignation, termination, or early retirement, the negotiated voluntary or involuntary
expulsion from the workplace, follows. For the victim, death -
through illness or suicide - may be the final chapter in the mobbing
story.” -ibid
Much of the original research on mobbing was done by Swedish researcher
Heinz Leymann in the 1980’s. His findings have been slow in making it
to the United States. However a number of local statutes have been enacted,
and publications, conferences, and resources have surfaced recently in
the U.S. For example, Peralta Community College District in Oakland recently
established a regulation outlawing such behavior.
Often mobbing activities are directed at whistleblowers. Brian Martin,
in Whistleblowing and Nonviolencen (Peace and Change, Vol. 24,
No. 3, January 1999) describes attacks on whistleblowers this way:
Whistleblowing, in casual usage, means speaking out from within an organization
to expose a social problem or, more generally, dissenting from
dominant views or practices... The most common experience of whistleblowers
is that they are attacked. Instead of their messages being evaluated,
the full power of the organization is turned against the whistleblower.
This is commonly called the shoot-the-messanger syndrome,... The means of suppression
are impressive, nonetheless. They include ostracism by colleagues, petty
harassment (including snide remarks, assignment to trivial tasks and
invoking of regulations not normally enforced), spreading of rumors, formal
reprimands, transfer to positions with no work (or too much work), demotion,
referral to psychiatrists, dismissal, and blacklisting.
Whistleblowers often discover that formal channels for complaint or remedy
are ineffective or easily blocked. As Martin explains, “Appeal bodies
are part of the wider system of power and usually seek or reach accommodation
with other powerful groups. Hence such bodies are highly unlikely to
support a single individual against elites from a major organization, who usually
have links with elites elsewhere.”
Whistleblowers have other resources, according to Martin: “One strategy is
based on ‘mobilization,’ namely winning supporters by circulating relevant
documents, holding meetings and obtaining media coverage.” Howeve, such attempts
at mobilization are often met by more severe mobbing and harassment.
Kenneth Westhues, has identified academic institutions as a primary location
for mobbing attacks:“Ordinarily, colleagues in positions of
local power explain the situation in terms of failings of the targeted professor:
bad teaching, too few publications or the wrong kind, ethical misconduct, shirking
of duties, failure to live up to legitimate expectations of the job...
Sometimes, however, the target's failings have little to do with why he or she
is in trouble. The evidence may point to a sharply contrasting explanation:
that colleagues and/or administrators have ganged up on the targeted
professor for no good reason, to the point that collectively shunning, shaming,
and tormenting the target bolsters the group's solidarity, its esprit
de corps.” - Workplace Mobbing in Academe (2004)
Westhues also tracks the trajectory of mobbing, and its consequences
for victims and perpetrators. Here are more of his comments:
“Mobbing ... is an impassioned, collective campaign by co-workers to
exclude, punish, and humiliate a targeted worker. Initiated most often
by a person in a position of power or influence, mobbing is a desperate
urge to crush and eliminate the target. The urge travels through the
workplace like a virus, infecting one person after another. The
target comes to be viewed as absolutely abhorrent, with no redeeming qualities,
outside the circle of acceptance and respectability, deserving only of
contempt. As the campaign proceeds, a steadily larger range of hostile ploys
and communications comes to be seen as legitimate.”“Not infrequently,
mobbing spelled the end of the target’s career, marriage, health, and
livelihood. From a study of circumstances surrounding suicides in Sweden,
Leymann estimated that about twelve percent of people who take their
own lives have recently been mobbed at work.... By Leymann’s and others' estimates,
between two and five percent of adults are mobbed sometime during their
working lives. The other 95 percent, involved in the process only as
observers, bystanders, or perpetrators (though occasionally also as rescuers
or guardians of the target), mostly deny, gloss over, and forget the
mobbing cases in which they took part. That is one reason it has taken
so long for the phenomenon to be identified and researched.
“Workplace mobbing is normally carried out politely, without
any violence, and with ample written documentation. Yet even without
the blood, the bloodlust is essentially the same: contagion and mimicking of
unfriendly, hostile acts toward the target; relentless undermining of
the target’s self-confidence; group solidarity against one whom all agree
does not belong; and the euphoria of collective attack.
“The worker most vulnerable to being mobbed is an average or high achiever
who is personally invested in a formally secure job, but who nonetheless
somehow threatens or puts to shame co-workers and/or managers. “Ironically,
it is in workplaces where workers’ rights are formally protected that the complex
and devious incursions on human dignity that constitute mobbing
most commonly occur. Union shops are one example... University faculties
are another, on account of the special protections of tenure and academic freedom
professors have...Mobbing appears to be more common in the professional
service sector, where work is complex, goals ambiguous, best practices
debatable, and market discipline far away. Scapegoating is an effective if temporary
means of achieving group solidarity, when it cannot be achieved in a
more constructive way. It is a turning inward, a diversion of energy
away from serving nebulous external purposes toward the deliciously clear, specific
goal of ruining a disliked co-worker's life. Less time, skill,
and energy are required to write off a persistent critic as a "difficult professor"
than to rebut the critic's arguments. Chalking up dissent to the dissenter's
real or imagined flaws of character relieves overworked administrators
of uncertainty and ambiguity. It lets them feel good about themselves.
Westhues (and others) point out that the best way to deal with mobbing
is to nip it in the bud. Organizations not able to do this are at least
as much at fault as the perpetrators of the attacks. To stop it requires an
open atmosphere at the very beginning: “The basic priority for
constructive resolution of workplace conflict, namely to keep the conversation
going, to let competing positions be expressed and the evidence for them
reviewed, to listen to what opponents say, to respond honestly and respectfully,
to try not to silence anyone.”Westhues lists three points for a strong
academic institution which has vaccinated itself against mobbing:
- Protect freedom of speech.
- Keep academic organization loose. A tight ship cannot be a university.
It has to be full of contradiction and brimming with debate in order
to fulfill its public purposes.
- Focus attention on these purposes, like educating youth, producing useful
knowledge, and above all seeking truth.
These quotes on mobbing were collected and prepared by Karl Schaffer(schafferkarl@fhda.edu,
x8214), as a public service to the DeAnza College community. In
addition to the sources cited above, google “mobbing” or “workplace
abuse” for more info.
Posted by Soulskill on Wednesday April 23,
@03:39PM
from the competition-is-a-good-thing
dept.
An anonymous reader points out a Los Angeles
Times report that Sony is planning on making
movies and TV shows
available for download through the PS3
"as early as this summer." Sony hopes to
make use of the roughly 4 million PS3s
already sold in the US to compete with
similar services such as XBox Live, which
began offering video downloads
over a year ago.
"One of the
service's greatest obstacles may be Sony's
own culture. Sony Chairman and Chief
Executive Howard Stringer has been battling
a corporate silo mentality in which
divisions within his company work in
isolation, undermining new initiatives. The
PlayStation group in Foster City, Calif.,
has been notoriously aloof. Once, a former
executive said, it scuttled plans for a
movie subscription service for the
PlayStation Portable even though Sony
Pictures had supported the initiative. What
is more, the company, looking to safeguard
its film, television and music holdings, has
been an aggressive champion of copyright
protection, often, critics suggest, at the
cost of technological innovation."
Very questionable arguments. Primitive lebertarian persepective and
corresponding bias. See also [PDF]
The Myth of the Rational Voter
The Myth of The Rational Economist,
November 3, 2007
The problem with this book is its basic premise,
that our problems are caused by ignorant voters, is
simply nonsense. Caplan fails to notice that the
policies that this nation is following are not those
that the voters want.
If it mattered what the voters thought, Gore would
be president, American boys would not be dieing in a
pointless war in Iraq, NAFTA would be be canceled,
we would get out of the WTO, we would control
illegal immigration, our government would protect
the interests of American workers instead of the
interests of multinational corporations that
outsource the best American jobs to slave labor
countries, and we would have free quality health
care for all Americans. That is what the voters in
this country want.
The point is that we are not in trouble because we
are following the wishes of irrational voters. We
are in trouble because we are ignoring the wishes of
the voters and following the policies favored by
irrational economists. like him.
"Don't confuse us with the facts!", June 8, 2007
By
Nicole
(Norwalk, CT USA) -
See all my reviews
Many people have noted that democracy seems not to work -
policies are implemented that often are not in the best interest of voters, and
when voters are surveyed they routinely lack even the most basic civic knowledge.
The way people have typically answered this problem is to say that voters are uninformed,
and that if they simply had more access to good information, they would use that
information to make better choices. But even so, the tiny informed minority will
sway elections because the uninformed majority will vote at random.
Here, Caplan directly challenges that view by asserting that voters are not simply
ignorant but irrational, and that this is in fact predicted by economic theory.
Voting is not like shopping - it is more like making use of a commons, because the
costs of a "bad" vote are borne by the public at large, and the chance of an individual
casting the deciding vote is tiny. Therefore, people will vote for what makes them
feel good without bothering to find out whether it really is good - it simply doesn't
matter. Caplan explores four systematic biases voters hold against good economic
policy - antimarket bias, antiforeign bias, make-work bias, and pessimistic bias.
The fact that systematic bias exists means that the irrational majority does not
in fact vote at random, so it's the irrational voters deciding who wins elections
rather than the small, informed, rational minority. Voters get what they want, it's
just that what they want is actually bad for them - and they don't care!
Caplan makes a persuasive case for viewing the average voter as irrational rather
than simply ignorant, though admittedly I am sympathetic to this idea to begin with.
I wish he had been able to include more recommendations in his conclusion, but this
should be a promising area for further research.
Economists know best?, July
25, 2007
This book is a very interesting read, describing a
utility-based model of why voters vote as they do.
The author proposes that voters are naturally biased
against their own interests. The concept is that the
probability of any one voter changing the result of
a vote is vanishingly small, and therefore each
voter votes for what makes them feel better about
themselves, even if the policies go against their
own interest and the interests of the economy. For
example, voters vote for higher taxes, large
inefficient government programs, and protectionist
policies.
For example, a voter might vote for a politician who
promises to raise the voter's taxes and give their
money to the poor. The voter figures that the
chances that their individual vote would make the
difference between the candidate winning or losing
is extremely small; making the cost of the vote
effectively zero. However, the psychic benefit of
the vote is positive.
Where the author fails is in the chapter where he
measures the policy leanings of an artificial
"enlightened voter". How he defines an "enlightened
voter" is an average voter with the statistical
characteristics of one having a graduate degree in
Economics. Based on a sophisticated
multivariate-regression-based analysis, the author
determines that an "enlightened voter" would be
predicted to view potential policies more like... an
economist! What a surprise!
Caplan asserts that the voting public would support
more reasonable policies if they all had graduate
degrees in economics. However, there are plenty of
Econ PhD's who put too much faith in government
policies solving apparent market failures.
The book is well worth reading, and makes many good
points regarding the reasons why voters vote for
policies that go against their own best interests,
and in aggregate against the health of the overall
economy. However, it does not make a convincing case
that economists should be running the show.
Nice humor or satire, if you wish... I especially like: "The chief cause of PADD is the desire to avoid the very real
pain of cognitive dissonance"
According to a report not yet released, the Council on Science and Public
Health of the
American Medical Association has recommended that a chronic and widespread
affliction of Americans be officially declared a psychiatric disorder. It has
been named the Political Attention Deficit Disorder (PADD). It is recommended
that the disorder be included in a widely used mental illness manual created
and published by the
American Psychiatric Association. The current manual was published in 1994;
the next edition is to be completed in 2012. The benefit to people of an official
classification is coverage by
health insurance.
"The
symptoms of PADD are all around us and treating it professionally can do
more for our country than any election," said Dr. Mable Wank in the report's
introduction; she is chairwoman of the Council and a professor at UCLA.
Here are the Council's main findings on PADD:
Nearly 80 percent of adult
American citizens are unable to pay sustained attention to issues and
problems associated with their government. They are unable to accept their
responsibility as citizens, including their obligation to vote, read in-depth
articles and
books on political issues, become active members of politically oriented
groups, and initiate discussions on current
events with
friends and family. "The decades-old decline in voter turnout is a direct
result of a national epidemic of PADD," said the report.
The chief cause of PADD is the desire to avoid the very real
pain of cognitive dissonance, the difference between what Americans want
to believe about the greatness of their country and the disturbing
reality that their government and country are in terrible shape, which is
a constant reminder when there is normal,
healthy political attention. Such
pain suppression, however, is counterproductive and was found through careful
studies at several universities, including the Harvard Medical College, to correlate
with
depression and anxiety disorders, as well as a heightened level of cynicism
and despair. According to the report, many suicides and possibly many criminal
acts result from PADD.
"For the past 25 years, the so-called 'Washington Consensus' – comprising measures
aimed at expanding the role of markets and constraining the role of the state –
has dominated economic development policy."
Dear reader, even if your taste runs to the practical rather than the theoretical,
I strongly suggest you read this
post from Thomas Palley.
Like it or not, most news reporting and just about all policy discussions in
the finance/economics realm are filtered through a particular frame of reference,
namely, neoclassical economics. Palley points out that the illusion that there
are two schools, namely the Chicago "free market" cohort (which has become the
"Washington consensus") versus the more interventionist MIT camp, obscures the
fact that they are subsets of neoclassical thought and that there are other
frameworks that have merit yet have been shunted aside.
Put more simply: it's important to recognize biases, otherwise you have no hope
of correcting for them.
From Palley:
For the past 25 years, the so-called “Washington
Consensus” – comprising measures aimed at expanding the role of markets
and constraining the role of the state – has dominated economic development
policy. As John Williamson, who coined the term, put it in
2002, these measures “are motherhood and apple pie, which is why they commanded
a consensus.”
Not anymore. Dani Rodrik, a renowned Harvard University economist, is the
latest to challenge the intellectual foundations of the Washington Consensus
in a powerful new book titled One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization,
Institutions, and Economic Growth. Rodrik’s thesis is that though there
is only one economics, there are many recipes for development success.
Rodrik has rendered a major service by stating so openly the claim of “one
economics.” A critic who made the same claim that economics allows only
one theoretical approach would be dismissed as paranoid, whereas Rodrik’s
standing creates an opportunity for a debate that would not otherwise be
possible.
The “many recipes” thesis is that countries develop successfully by following
eclectic policies tailored to specific local conditions rather than by following
generic best-practice formulas designed by economic theorists. This challenges
the Washington Consensus, with its one-size-fits-all formula of privatization,
deregulated labor markets, financial liberalization, international economic
integration, and macroeconomic stability based on low inflation.
But, while the many recipes thesis has strong appeal and empirical support,
and suggests a spirit of theoretical pluralism, the claim of “one economics”
is misguided, for it implies that mainstream neoclassical economics is the
only true economics.
Part of the difficulty of exposing this narrowness is that there is a family
split among neo-classical economists between those who believe that real-world
market economies approximate perfect competition and those who don’t. Believers
are identified with the “Chicago School,” whose leading exponents include
Milton Friedman and George Stigler. Non-believers are identified with the
“MIT School” associated with Paul Samuelson. Rodrik is of the MIT School,
as are such household names as Paul Krugman, Joseph Stiglitz, and Larry
Summers. This split obscures the underlying uniformity of thought.
The Chicago School claims that real-world market economies produce roughly
efficient (so-called “Pareto optimal”) outcomes on which public policy cannot
improve. Thus, any state intervention in the economy must make someone worse
off.
The MIT School, by contrast, argues that real-world economies are afflicted
by pervasive market failures, including imperfect competition and monopoly,
externalities associated with problems like pollution, and an inability
to supply public goods such as street lighting or national defense. Consequently,
policy interventions that address market failures – as well as widespread
information imperfections and the non-existence of many needed markets –
can make everyone better off.
None of this is about fairness, which is a separate issue. Indeed, neither
the Chicago School nor the MIT School say that market outcomes are fair,
because actual market outcomes depend on the initial distribution of resources.
If that distribution was unfair, current and future outcomes will be unfair,
too.
However, Chicago economists seem to believe that real-world outcomes are
acceptably unfair and, more importantly, that attempts to remedy unfairness
are too costly, because tampering with markets causes economic inefficiency.
Moreover, they believe that government intervention tends to generate its
own costly failures because of bureaucratic incompetence and rent-seeking,
whereby private interests try to steer policy to their own advantage.
MIT economists tend to espouse the opposite: fairness is important, the
real world is unacceptably unfair, and government failure can be prevented
by good institutional design, including democracy.
These differences reflect the intellectual richness of neo-classical economics,
but they provide no justification for the claim that there is one economics.
On the contrary, heterodox economists like Thorsten
Veblen and Joseph Schumpeter long ago raised many of today’s cutting-edge
issues in neoclassical economics, including the role of social norms and
the relationship between technological innovation and business cycles.
More importantly, heterodox economics includes core theoretical concepts
that are fundamentally incompatible with neoclassical economics in either
of its two contemporary forms. These concepts result in significantly different
explanations of the real world, including income distribution and the determinants
of economic activity and growth. Moreover, they often result in different
policy prescriptions.
The late Robert Heilbronner – one of Schumpeter’s most renowned students
– viewed economics as “worldly philosophy.” Just as philosophers are divided
on the nature of truth and understanding, economics is divided on the workings
of the real world. Paradigms should co-exist in economics, just as in other
social sciences. Yet, in practice, the dominance of the belief in “one economics,”
particularly in North America and Europe, has led increasingly to a narrow
and exclusionary view of the discipline.
This reality is difficult to convey. One reason is that liberal neo-classical
economists like Stiglitz and Krugman share values with heterodox economists,
and shared values are easily conflated with shared analysis. Another reason
is that heterodox and MIT School economists also often agree on policy,
even if their reasoning is different. Finally, most people are incredulous
that economists could be so audacious as to enforce one view of economics.
The “many recipes” thesis enriches neo-classical economics’ contribution
to the development debate, and many of its policy proposals will find support
from heterodox economists. However, it fails to engage the deep intellectual
divisions regarding economic development, trade, and globalization, because
it refuses to admit the legitimacy of such disagreements.
By repeating the claim of “one economics,” Rodrik
inadvertently reveals the censorship embedded in contemporary economics.
The great challenge is not to admit that there are many recipes,
but rather to create space for other perspectives on economic analysis and
policy.
Copyright Thomas I. Palley
Groupthink occurs when the pressure to conform within a group interferes
with that group's analysis of a problem and causes poor group decision making.
Individual creativity, uniqueness, and independent thinking are lost in the
pursuit of group cohesiveness, as are the advantages that can sometimes be obtained
by making a decision as a group—bringing different sources of ideas, knowledge,
and experience together to solve a problem. Psychologist Irving Janis defines
groupthink as: "a mode of thinking people engage in when they are deeply involved
in a cohesive in-group, when the members' striving for unanimity override their
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action. Groupthink
refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment
that results from in-group pressures." It can also refer to the tendency of
groups to agree with powerful, intimidating bosses.
The concept of groupthink provides a summary explanation of reasons groups
sometimes make poor decisions. Indeed, groups are supposed to be better than
individuals at making complex decisions, because, through the membership, a
variety of differing perspectives are brought to bear. Group members not only
serve to bring new ideas into the discussion but also act as error-correcting
mechanisms. Groups also provide social support, which is especially critical
for new ideas. But when new perspectives are rejected (as in the "not invented
here" syndrome), it is hard to correct errors. And if the social support is
geared toward supporting the group's "accepted wisdom," the elements that can
make groups better decision makers than individuals become inverted, and instead
make them worse. Just as groups can work to promote effective thinking/decision
making, the same processes which enhance the group's operation can
backfire and lead to disastrous results.
(Hayes
Brunswick & Partners, LLC )
Ken Lay understandably is among the least admired individuals in America today.
Enron Corp.'s former chief executive officer allegedly oversaw one of the biggest
accounting scams in corporate history, the full repercussions of which are still
unknown as each day seems to bring a new twist to the horrific scandal.
Yet, it would be somewhat comforting if it turns out that Lay conceived and
executed the scandal knowing in advance the repercussions of his actions, much
like Frank Gruttadauria, the Cleveland stockbroker who allegedly bilked old
ladies and other clients out of millions of dollars by doctoring their account
statements. Gruttadauria reportedly displayed all the signs of a classic sociopath,
including beguiling charm and feigned empathy for his victims. He apparently
acted alone and mysteriously disappeared before his scheme was discovered, the
telltale signs of a classic scam. How neat and simple it would be to similarly
lay Enron's demise at the feet of one person.
But Lay did not act alone -- and that may very well be one of the most disturbing
elements of the Enron debacle. He had the enthusiastic support of a venerable
cast of characters, including some high-priced lawyers, accountants, investment
bankers and management consultants. Did Lay systematically entwine his advisers
into a preconceived web of deception? Highly unlikely. Indeed, it's becoming
increasingly clear that financial legerdemain was not unique to Enron; several
other companies disclosed this week that they are delaying or reconsidering
their earnings. In what may be another ominous sign, The Wall Street Journal
reported that Moody's Investor Service has quietly sent out letters to more
than 4,000 companies the agency rates asking for more information on their "off-balance-sheet
financial arrangements."
Given the tragic fallout resulting from Enron's collapse, the cacophony of voices
clamoring to bring the scandal's alleged masterminds to justice will no doubt
grow louder still in the weeks ahead. But it is naive to think that culpability
rests entirely with Lay, his lieutenants, and some wayward lawyers and auditors.
The tragedy of Enron is that it was caused by what is known as "groupthink."
Truth be told, almost everyone associated with the company contributed in some
way to its collapse. The concept of groupthink was identified and coined by
Dr. Irving Janis, a professor of psychology at the University of California-Berkeley
and at Yale University, to explain the faulty decisions that led to some of
our nation's biggest tragedies, including the Bay of Pigs invasion, the escalation
of the Vietnam War, the Watergate break-in and the explosion of the Challenger
space shuttle. Janis defines groupthink as "a mode of thinking where pressure
for unanimity overwhelms the members' motivation to realistically appraise the
alternative courses of action. Group pressure leads to carelessness
and poor decisions. This eventually results in irrational thinking and action."
In the case of the Challenger space shuttle, for example, NASA engineers knew
about the dangers of conducting a launch in 36-degree weather but chose to minimize
them. The pressures from NASA's top brass not to further delay the historic
mission were just too great.
Enron was fertile ground for groupthink to take hold. The company's macho ethos
was to feed Wall Street's insatiable appetite for spectacular earnings at all
costs. This led to the creation of "killer apps," "new paradigms" and a plethora
of esoteric financial instruments that few people even understood. But given
Wall Street's unmitigated support for (and vested interest in) the arcane products,
it hardly mattered. The regulators nodded. Investors cheered. And the media
trumpeted the innovations.
Lay and his management team eventually came to see themselves as true masters
of their universe, replete with the inevitable illusion of invulnerability.
The company proudly fostered a Darwinian atmosphere, in which employees falling
into the lower percentiles of performance were summarily dismissed. In Enron's
heyday, it was sheer folly for an employee to question Enron's innovative management
practices, and the few that did either voluntarily resigned or were fired. Enron's
accountants and lawyers no doubt knew that if they didn't go along and bless
the company's activities, management could easily find some other high-priced
firms that would. Enron was a cult, and there were no shortage of takers
lining up for the company's sucrative Kool-Aid, oblivious that the sweet drink
would have a very bitter aftertaste.
Groupthink is an enclosed system of thought, a folie, where those engaged
cross the boundary into unreality. Clearly, it leads to defective decision-making,
resulting in a low probability of successful outcome. In the end, at
Enron, there was a massive failure to examine and appreciate the risks taken,
along with a failure of contingency planning. The results speak for themselves.
In the wake of Enron, responsible boards of directors should be aggressively
investigating whether groupthink is permeating the companies they oversee. A
healthy organization fosters a culture whereby employees are both empowered
and expected to debate and challenge each other and consider alternative courses
of action. A mechanism must be in place where employees can report any
perceived irregularities without fear of retribution. It is incumbent on directors
to ensure that the information on which they base decisions comes from sources
other than the CEO and advisors or consultants that are beholden to the executive.
It would be wise to occasionally bring in outside parties to conduct a "reality
check."
At the end of the day, Lay was an inspired -- though highly flawed leader --
working in a company that lost its way. The policies and actions that caused
Enron's downfall were years in the making. The "horse was out of the barn" and
no one, including Lay, could change the adverse course of events once their
world began to unravel. It appears that legions of normally thoughtful people
crossed the boundary into unreality; they all "drank the Kool-Aid," reinforcing
one another's view of reality and entered into a world of their own design and
creation. It's likely that the growing pressures, as problems arose, drove Lay
and his senior managers further beyond the boundary of accountability, and then
deluded themselves further into believing that they could get away with their
machinations and schemes.
Unfortunately, we all are victims of their delusion. It will be up to the courts
to decide an appropriate punishment for their misguided ways.
"Our complex global economy is built upon millions of small, private acts
of psychological surrender, the willingness of people to acquiesce in playing
their assigned parts as cogs in the great social machine that encompasses all
other machines. They must shape themselves to the prefabricated identities that
make efficient coordination possible... that capacity for self-enslavement must
be broken.” (Theodore Roszak - The Voice Of The Earth)
Heart Murmurs
Few tasks are more challenging than that of attending to our subtle, internal
responses to the world against the deafening roar of what is deemed ‘obviously
true‘. Writing in the 1930s, the anarchist Rudolf Rocker made the point that
the state is not a disinterested spectator on the issue of freedom of thought.
In his classic work, Culture And Nationalism, Rocker wrote:
"The state welcomes only those forms of cultural activity which help
it to maintain its power. It persecutes with implacable hatred any activity
which oversteps the limits set by it and calls its existence into question.
It is, therefore, as senseless as it is mendacious to speak of a ‘state
culture‘; for it is precisely the state which lives in constant warfare
with all higher forms of intellectual culture and always tries to avoid
the creative will of culture." (Rocker, Culture and Nationalism, Michael
E. Coughlan, 1978, p.85)
The stakes, Rocker noted, are high:
"If the state does not succeed in guiding the cultural forces within
its sphere of power into courses favourable to its ends, and thus inhibit
the growth of higher forms, these very higher forms will sooner or later
destroy the political frame which they rightly regard as a hindrance." (Rocker,
p.83)
If this strikes us as implausible (as it should), it is for a very good reason.
It seems incredible to us that individuals working for the state - in government,
education, local government - could be eagerly working to “reduce all human
activity to a single pattern”. Are they not human beings like us? Do they not
seek freedom of thought, independence of mind, for their own children?
It is a very reasonable argument and applies equally to the media. Dissident
analysts claim, and in fact demonstrate, that truth is filtered, depleted to
a dramatic degree by the corporate media. But surely the men and women of the
press - again, human beings like us - are not eagerly striving to oppress humanity.
The answer is found in the way the performance of an organisation is shaped
by its primary, bottom line goals. As I have discussed elsewhere, the process
is similar to the mechanisms underlying crystal formation. The near-perfect,
symmetrical shapes of snowflakes and other crystalline structures are no accident
but flow from the founding conditions around which the crystals form.
[Posted August 29, 2001]
You see it in daycare centers, and you see it in the public schools, from kindergarten
to high school. Group projects abound, shoving together individuals
who have no formal bonds, yet are banded together
for the purpose of collective decision-making.Universities,
both public and private, are not immune to this affliction. In fact, if you
attend a business college today, you’ll think it’s the newest rage, but it’s
been the rule for decades.
Most university programs may not use group projects, but undergraduate
and graduate programs in business are full of them. It is our contention that
group projects are criminal in themselves and should be abolished on moral grounds,
in that they function as collectivist indoctrination. Like government
schools, group projects homogenize thought and neuter high achievers.
Individuality is forced out of our kids at an early age. After
all, group projects are often the standard for young children in childcare situations,
where the young ones are often taught that individuals don't do things
or go places, groups do. By college age, the collective cast of mind
has only gotten more oppressive. Groupthink is a process of gradualism that
seeks to gently merge the followers into a pack with leaders, the hope being
that the leaders will pull up those who typically reside on the low end of the
motivation and achievement scale.
For example, a professor assigns an innocuous academic exercise,
such as a term paper, communications presentation, or marketing proposal. It
is turned into a group project by fiat—the professor segments the class into
groups. More often than not, these groups are not even voluntary. When the students
turn in their papers, the professor usually assigns the same grade to everyone
in the group.
Another common stratagem in this setting is to have group
members grade one another and develop useful constructive criticism for fellow
teammates. However, this commonly dovetails into grades by mutual agreement.
If one member doesn't go along with this forced "agreement" by granting the
agreed-upon concessions, he is usually excoriated by his fellow groupthinkers
for doing so. This is a pact where honest evaluations take a back seat to easy
A's and phony feel-goodism.
Shirking is the most immediate danger within group projects.
Usually, the group members with some semblance of a work ethic labor hard and
often to take up the slack from the free riders. There are other dangers as
well. In a case experienced by one of us, for example, a group member
simply cut and pasted text from the Web instead of writing up his share of the
research. Thus, the final version of the paper given to the professor was 20
percent pure plagiarism, unbeknownst to the rest of the group until it was too
late. The slacker got a grade of 98 for the project, as did the people who actually
worked.
In other cases, the shirking of duties simply cannot be overcome.
High achievers are forced to relax their standards and accept being reduced
to the lowest common denominator in the group. This can have a dreadful effect
on work ethic and attitudes through the following insidious lessons instilled
by group projects:
Lesson 1: You will learn cooperation, not
competition.
Lesson 2: The achiever will be taxed: The
reward of his efforts will go to others, so the low achiever who exerts
little effort and contributes almost nothing will be taken care of by the
professor (serving as the government).
Lesson 3: Individualism will not be allowed.
The individual with the best ideas will do what the group decides. If you
have an original or daring thought, forget it. The group will write up a
bland sack of platitudes that represents the thinking of its lowest common
denominator.
Lesson 4: Conservatism and caution are the
name of the game. Whereas high achievers constantly strive to better themselves
and have the room to operate in a more daring realm, the low achievers want
things quickly and easily as they conform to less strict standards for excellence.
The result is likely to be one of mediocrity.
Lesson 5: Get used to the emotional feel
of a collectivist, totalitarian state. If you are an individualist with
a work ethic and a drive to excel, you will be pounded down until you adopt
the debilitating, depressing learned helplessness that socialism produces.
If you are a slacker, however, a free rider with no qualms about living
on the purloined toil of honest people, you can feel relieved, satisfied,
secure; if you are a thoroughgoing scumbag, you can even feel pride in any
good grade given you on the backs of your teammates.
Business programs, in forcing group settings upon (previously)
ambitious students, are responding to the demands of the business community.
This can be dangerous.
First, the business community isn’t always the only entity
to ask for the secrets of success. Successful businessmen such as Ted Turner
and Warren Buffett have proven they don’t understand well what makes success
possible. They know how to make money in ignorance of the economic principles
that make it possible. This is due in part to the fact that most tycoons have
navigated an ocean of government regulations in making their fortunes, and they
mistakenly conclude that the government therefore had something to do with their
success.
Second, and more ominous, business schools are usually the
only programs on campus employing any right-wing (if mildly so) professors.
Having the only campus department that makes extensive, mandatory use of group
projects, business programs subject and desensitize their hapless students to
the most realistically socialist experience available at most universities.
Administrators are probably comfortable in the knowledge that the group project
experience more than compensates for professors who occasionally dare to admit
publicly that market solutions are better than government dictates. And students
aren’t the only ones ruined: after enough years of being commissars, professors
may slowly convert to the leftist mentality as well.
In truth, groupthink has become a chronic problem in universities;
it is a consensus-seeking process that does not allow for the preservation of
individuality. It stifles creativity for the purpose of compromise and agreement.
The university—through its group-project mentality—has become a test lab for
socialization skills. The fostering of such rigid cooperation and coerced integration
can be had only at the expense of lesser accomplishment.
Ayn Rand had it right when she said that any collectivist
system is necessarily self-defeating no matter what its specific policies or
leaders. After all, if Johnny is in your group and he can't read or write very
well, you'll be getting Johnny's grades.
WASHINGTON - In a 1972 book, 'Victims
of Groupthink: A Psychology Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes',
Irving Janis identified the Vietnam War and the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba
as particularly compelling examples of how very smart people can collectively
make very stupid decisions.
In studying the Bay of Pigs, for example, Janis noted that the group around
President John Kennedy made a series of assumptions -- that Cubans would welcome
the invasion and rise up against Fidel Castro and that the U.S. could credibly
deny involvement in the invasion, if necessary -- that were fundamentally deluded.
As in Iraq, many of those assumptions were based largely on the accounts
of exiles and defectors, but the group dynamics involved in decision-making
also played a key role in rallying the administration of the ''best and the
brightest'' behind an adventure that proved disastrous, according to Janis.
A great deal more is known about group dynamics within the Bush administration
foreign-policy apparatus today -- as a result of leaks, memoirs, and books,
such as Bob Woodward's 'Plan
of Attack' and Jim Mann's 'Rise
of the Vulcans' -- than was known at the time about the Kennedy administration.
And what is known suggests the existence of two major groups -- an ''in-group''
of hawks whose captain is Vice President Dick Cheney and which has had a decisive
influence on Bush himself, and an ''out-group'' of ''realists'' headed by Secretary
of State Colin Powell and his deputy, Richard Armitage.
While the out-group, which ironically boasts men, including Powell, Armitage,
ret. Gens. Anthony Zinni and Brent Scowcroft, with real war experience, the
in-group is dominated by individuals, particularly Cheney and virtually the
entire civilian leadership of the Pentagon, who have none at all.
Hence the moniker ''chickenhawks'', defined as individuals who favor
military solutions to political problems but who themselves avoided military
service during wartime. Cheney, who received five different deferments from
the military draft during the Vietnam War, famously told an interviewer once
that he ”had other priorities'' in the 1960s than military service.
What also makes the in-group so remarkable is its very small size, the long
history it has shared together, and its close personal relationships.
Pentagon chief Donald Rumsfeld and Cheney, for example, worked together under
Richard Nixon and have been the very best of friends ever since. Their neo-conservative
aides and advisers, such as Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, former
Defense Policy Board (DPB) chairman Richard Perle, and DPB member Kenneth Adelman,
likewise have been close for more than three decades and have personally mentored
other top aides and advisers, such as Cheney's chief of staff, I. Lewis Libby,
Defense Undersecretaries for Policy and Intelligence, Douglas Feith and Stephen
Cambone, respectively, and Weekly Standard editor William Kristol, to name just
a few.
The sense of kinship that unites the group is illustrated in part by a dinner
hosted by Cheney shortly after U.S. troops took Baghdad 13 months ago. The guests
included Wolfowitz, Libby, and Adelman; the atmosphere, warm and celebratory
as they recounted their defeat of the ''realists. ''Someone mentioned Powell,
and there were chuckles around the table'', Woodward noted. And then ''They
turned to Rumsfeld, the missing brother'', and told affectionate stories about
their past associations with the crusty Pentagon chief.
When Adelman said he had been surprised U.S. troops had not yet found weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), he was assured by Wolfowitz, ''We'll find them'',
and by Cheney, ''It's only been four days really. We'll find them''.
Students of Groupthink list a number of symptoms of the phenomenon that can
lead the group into disaster, among them:
- believing in the group's inherent morality;
- sharing stereotypes, particularly of the enemy;
- examining few alternative or contingency plans for any action;
- being highly selective in gathering information;
- avoiding expert opinion;
- protecting the group from negative views or information that would contradict
their basic assumptions;
- and - having an illusion of invulnerability.
From what is now known about planning for Iraq, each of these factors obviously
played a role, and they continue to inform U.S. policy not only against perceived
enemies, but even against out-groups in the administration or in Congress. And,
because the in-group was so small, many of these characteristics were unusually
pronounced.
The notion that the chickenhawks were morally superior, not just to Saddam
Hussein or the ''terrorists'' or ''Ba'athist dead-enders'' whom they've been
fighting since the war ended, extended even to the ''realists'', who were denounced
in internal battles as ''appeasers'' or worse. As Cheney was recently quoted
as declaring with regard to State Department proposals to engage North Korea,
''We don't negotiate with evil; we defeat it''.
Middle East experts at the State Department and the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) were likewise scorned and excluded from both planning and the immediate
aftermath of the invasion, while the creation in Feith's office of ad hoc intelligence
analysis groups that ''stovepiped'' evidence of Iraqi WMD and ties to Al Qaeda
was a classic illustration of selective intelligence gathering that would confirm
pre-existing stereotypes.
Similarly, the total failure to prepare contingency plans to deal with looting,
or even with the emergence of an insurgency against the occupation, displayed
a confidence that turned out to be completely unwarranted. Likewise, former
Army chief of staff Gen. Eric Shinseki's prediction that more than 200,000 troops
would be needed to occupy Iraq in order to ensure security had not only to be
rejected in order to protect the group from negative views; it had to be publicly
ridiculed by Wolfowitz as ''wildly off the mark''.
In his latest expose on the prisoner-abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib, New Yorker
correspondent Seymour Hersh noted that Rumsfeld's penchant for ''secrecy and
wishful thinking'' -- characteristics that also apply to Groupthink -- resulted
in the Pentagon's failure to do anything about it or about the many other problems
they have encountered.
And whenever Powell or Armitage tried to bring to the attention of the highest
levels in the administration the growing concern about prisoner abuse, according
to a source recently cited in the ''Nelson Report'', an insider Washington newsletter,
they were forced to endure from the chickenhawks what an eyewitness source characterized
as ''around-the-table, coarse, vulgar, frat-boy bully remarks about what these
tough guys would do if THEY ever got their hands on prisoners...''
On July 8, Asia Times Online broke the story
(Patriotic
pride and fear) of how noted Canadian psychologist Daniel Burston
(two PhDs from Canada's York University and a widely acclaimed author) perceived
a broad retreat into "social fantasy systems" and "socially patterned defects"
as explaining much of the Bush administration's decision-making. He observed
for ATol that such flaws bring those involved to "act in ways which - from an
outsiders perspective - look insane". On the following day, July 9, the US Senate
Intelligence Committee released its report on the United States' justification
for the Iraq war, claiming an erroneous "groupthink" was to blame, and coincidentally
highlighting the validity of Burston's observations.
Groupthink is defined as "a mode of thinking that people engage in when they
are deeply involved in a cohesive group, when the members' strivings for unanimity
override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action".
In other words, retreat into a "social fantasy system" allowed "socially patterned
defects" to flourish within the group's members.
The Senate Intelligence Committee chairman, Republican Senator Pat Roberts of
Kansas, stated that "it is clear this groupthink also extended to our allies
and to the United Nations and several other nations as well". The July 8 ATol
piece provides parallel commentary on this, noting that "in most cases, destructive
impulses are rationalized, ensuring 'at least a few other people or a whole
social group share in the rationalization and thus make it appear to be realistic
to the members of such a group'. In effect, an emotional-support network is
formed, providing its individual members with a mistaken sense of legitimacy."
In an October 2003 article titled "Cheney's hawks hijacking policy", this journalist
revealed that former senior Pentagon staffer Lieutenant-Colonel Karen Kwiatkowski
(retired) described "a subversion of constitutional limits on executive power
and a co-optation through deceit of a large segment of the Congress", adding
that "in order to take that first step - Iraq - lies had to be told to Congress
to bring them on board". Planned and deliberate lies were told in order to manipulate
Congress and the American people purposefully, effectively, and criminally,
undercutting the very foundations of US democracy.
Not to be misunderstood, the "groupthink" in question is far from innocent error,
and administration critics charge that the Senate Intelligence Committee reports'
attempts to couch blame as mere "fuzzy thinking" highlight the propaganda efforts
ongoing, the groupthink still dominating policy. But this psychological phenomenon
perhaps best translates to a broad failure to appreciate the reality of circumstance,
the nature or implications of actions, the very difference between right and
wrong. And while a hard core of believers/leaders is typically central to such
a phenomenon's workings, their influence radiates broadly outward through their
immediate group(s) and those they interface with.
Coincident with the Intelligence Committee's report, Senator Roberts defended
the Iraq war as justified for humanitarian reasons, though numerous human-rights
organizations have condemned the US record in Iraq, the war crimes that US forces
are alleged to have committed there.
Notably, before the Iraq war began, numerous figures had publicly challenged
the Bush administration's prewar assertions. On September 9, 2002, CNN had headlined
"Former weapons inspector: Iraq not a threat", noting, "Former UN weapons inspector
Scott Ritter says US military action against Iraq would be a mistake." And oil-war
questions were abundant.
But highlighting the dynamics of what was ongoing, Kwiatkowski had charged that
"there was an extra-governmental network operating outside normal structures
and practices, 'a network of political appointees in key positions who felt
they needed to take some action, to make things happen in a foreign affairs,
national security way'. She said Pentagon personnel and the DIA [Defense Intelligence
Agency] were pressured to favorably alter assessments and reports", a hard core
of misguided individuals within the administration of US President George W
Bush enjoying "a mistaken sense of legitimacy" in their efforts, spreading this
false and wrongful mindset to many of those they encountered.
While groupthink is undoubtedly to blame for the Iraq war's false premises,
the full implications of the "groupthink" that occurred, as well as that which
is ongoing, appear to have yet to emerge.
Highlighting a disturbing reality, Burston had noted parallels between the social
psychology of the present and that of the 1930s.
In a further parallel to the 1930s, on July 9 the conservative Chicago Sun-Times
(one of the United States' top 50 papers) ran a commentary on US fascism,
stating that "fascism' is not an exaggeration", and adding that anyone who doubted
this "doesn't know what fascism is". It went on to note: "Some liberals
suggest that the administration is capable of canceling the November election
on the grounds of national security if it looks like Bush would lose. I doubt
this." But on July 11 and 12, news of the administration seeking legal authority
for just such an election postponement - a delay in the November election for
national-security reasons - widely broke.
Burston had said he believed the US could be poised "on the verge" of a corporate
fascism, and eminent political scientist Dr Michael Parenti (Yale PhD in political
science and author of 18 books) spoke similarly. And indeed, the slippery slope
of "groupthink" in effect provided the basis for the psycho-dynamics dominating
the rise of 1930s fascism, its proponents of a "new order" perceiving endless
lies, propaganda, repression, mass violence, and even mass murder as legitimate
means to what they perceived as their "noble" ends, versus tragic and criminal
delusions. Students of history will note the "groupthink" evidenced in Germany's
1930s mass rallies at Nuremberg, though the realization of what was then occurring
didn't fully emerge until the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunals of the 1940s.
As discussed in ATol's July 8 article, the process of groupthink then in effect
spawns "'socially patterned defects' that enabled large groups of people to
adjust themselves comfortably to a system that, humanly speaking, is 'fundamentally
at odds with our basic existential and human needs'". Burston then noted that
this resulted in "deficiencies, or traits, or attitudes which don't generate
internal conflict when, in fact, they should". He then cited "Nazi mass-murderer
Adolf Eichmann as representing the 'prototypical example' of what the phenomenon
of 'socially patterned defects' can engender", emphasizing that "with one very
questionable exception, Eichmann tested normal on all psychological tests that
were administered to him by mental-health experts before his trial".
In discussing questions of contemporary fascism with Asia Times Online, Dr Parenti
said, "When fascism came to power [in the 1930s], what it did was cut back on
the public sector, privatize a lot of state-owned industries, abolish inheritance
taxes and other taxes on the rich, abolish corporate taxes, cut wages, destroy
labor unions, and destroy or undermine opposition parties." He described
fascism as simply a tool employed by ruthless power-elites in achieving their
ambitions. He added: "There's a concern that we're [the US] heading
towards fascism, or that we're replicating fascism today."
Parenti saw citizenry being mobilized by "waving the flag in their face, and
wrapping the flag around the leader, and telling them that they're being threatened
by one menace or another, from abroad or within." In a parallel, Bush critics
have long charged his administration with precisely this. Parenti cited Nazi
Field Marshal Hermann Goering's similar explanation of popular motivation, which
emerged from the period of the Nuremberg Tribunal.
In a purely American vein, Parenti recalled that former US secretary of state
John Foster Dulles had said: "To get the people to support large military budgets
and intervention, you've got to conjure up a threat, and you've got to make
this scenario of 'one nation is a hero, another nation is a villain'. It's got
to be hero versus villain." And the Senate Intelligence report does aid parallels
between Dulles' vision and the Iraq war.
"You fool the people into thinking that you're protecting them, you're watching
out for their interests, and you get them to vote against their own interests,"
Parenti charged.
Comparing today's United States to the 1930s, Parenti addressed the recent US
Supreme Court decision allowing Vice President Dick Cheney and the Bush administration
to refuse public access to the documents of Cheney's so-called Energy Task Force.
Indications exist that oil-war questions were discussed within this group, a
September 2003 Inter Press Service article, "Oil war questions surround Cheney
energy group", addressing such concerns. Parenti strongly emphasized the implications
of the court decision.
"The Supreme Court decision does, in effect, lift the executive power to an
unaccountable and undemocratic status. So you really have no way for Congress
or the public to hold these people accountable for what they're doing. You're,
in effect, setting up a cloak of impunity on their actions under the guise of
'executive privilege' ... so what we're getting here is many of the same things
that the fascists accomplish, while maintaining a democratic veneer," Parenti
claimed, adding: "You're getting enormous tax cuts for the rich - there are
now corporations that are making billions of dollars in profits that are paying
no taxes - you're getting the rollback of trade unions through outsourcing,
closing down unionized factories ... you're getting depressed wages, wages aren't
keeping up with inflation; increasing spending in the military sector - this
is just exactly what the fascists did. So you're accomplishing a lot of these
same things without having to 'go all the way' and destroy every little shred
of democracy." Parenti then proceeded to draw a firm parallel with the Italian
1930s "corporative state".
"In practice, the big decisions regarding the political economy were made by
the industrialists," Parenti noted, but prefacing that by saying all groups
within the Italian corporative state were "supposed to" share the decision power.
He likened the large Italian industrialists' group to America's National Association
of Manufacturers, saying, "in effect, those were the guys who were really thoroughly
incorporated, and most of the ordinary people were left out in the cold, as
subjects of the state".
After a moment, Parenti quickly observed that "the people always get a share
of this action, though. The American people get a share of it, the Italians
did ... their share is the taxes and the blood. They pay the taxes, and they
send their sons off."
Notably, with the Nuremberg Tribunals, society long ago determined that those
who may commit criminal acts while influenced by groupthink are nevertheless
criminals, and should be judged accordingly.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact
content@atimes.com
for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
The phenomenon that group discipline and dynamics
leads to hindrances for new ideas in groups.
- "Yes! We're all individuals!" "I'm not"
Most broadly, groupthink occurs when a group
makes suboptimal decisions because of process problems or communication problems
due to
SocialNormalization.
Most or all of the group members may, privately, realize that the decisions
is a poor one but feel powerless to change it for fear of offending other group
members, injuring
SacredCows,
or detonating
LandMines.
If everyone takes for granted the group's perceived
opinion, the group will choke itself to death. This can give rise to the
Wiki:AbileneParadox.
Usually when this happens, the group is considered to have an identity all unto
itself. Sometimes it gets fuzzy whether or not the individuals have identities
or are even conscious. Sometimes it's fuzzy whether or not there's even such
a thing as an individual.
GroupThink is absolutely not
collective intelligence. In
CollectiveIntelligence, decisions are taken or opinions are set up by a
group of people in such a way you can't distinguish an individual as the "author"
of the decision or the opinion. To be achieved, it requires to get over groupthink.
In the situation where groupthinking occur, each individual tend to conform
his opinion to the opinion reached by the group. That often lead to bad choices,
as no individual entirely agrees with what he finds himself ultimately supporting;
also, it reduce creativity, as individuals tend to forget they have other choices
than the one displayed by the group.
Contrast
BarnRaising,
where TheIndividual
grants TheCollective
influence over his actions, but not his thoughts. This is
much more healthy.
Further reading: Groupthink : Psychological
Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, by Irving L. Janis
You will often see online people complain about
GroupThink
and how it must be combatted. This is justified by people's general, cynical
understanding of groupthink. To quote an anonymous author on this page:
- Groupthink generally refers to the collective stupidity, or lowest common
denominator of individual intelligence. It is mob rule. To err is human,
to really f*ck things up requires a committee.
However, certain
Depressing: (Score:5, Insightful)