I'm told that alcoholics and addicts have to hit bottom before they
are able to renounce their self destructive ways. Ironically, their
personal collapse makes them more capable of change than scientists,
who, according to Thomas Kuhn in his landmark, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, were so incapable of abandoning core beliefs that it would
take an entire generation for significant advances to become widely
accepted. The old guard literally had to die off before the new paradigm
could take hold.
Bear with me in delving deeper into this comparison. The Wikipedia
entry on Kuhn's work gives a sense of the
power and durability of existing frameworks:
There is a prevalent belief that all hitherto-unexplained phenomena
will in due course be accounted for in terms of this established
framework. Kuhn states that scientists spend most (if not all) of
their careers in a process of puzzle-solving. Their puzzle-solving
is pursued with great tenacity, because the previous successes of
the established paradigm tend to generate great confidence that
the approach being taken guarantees that a solution to the puzzle
exists, even though it may be very hard to find. Kuhn calls this
process normal science.As a paradigm is stretched to its limits,
anomalies — failures of the current paradigm to take into account
observed phenomena — accumulate. Their significance is judged by
the practitioners of the discipline. Some anomalies may be dismissed
as errors in observation, others as merely requiring small adjustments
to the current paradigm that will be clarified in due course. Some
anomalies resolve themselves spontaneously, having increased the
available depth of insight along the way. But no matter how great
or numerous the anomalies that persist, Kuhn observes, the practicing
scientists will not lose faith in the established paradigm for as
long as no credible alternative is available; to lose faith in the
solubility of the problems would in effect mean ceasing to be a
scientist.
In any community of scientists, Kuhn states, there are some individuals
who are bolder than most. These scientists, judging that a crisis
exists, embark on what Thomas Kuhn calls revolutionary science,
exploring alternatives to long-held, obvious-seeming assumptions.
Occasionally this generates a rival to the established framework
of thought. The new candidate paradigm will appear to be accompanied
by numerous anomalies, partly because it is still so new and incomplete.
The majority of the scientific community will oppose any conceptual
change, and, Kuhn emphasizes, so they should. In order to fulfill
its potential, a scientific community needs to contain both individuals
who are bold and individuals who are conservative.
We are desperately in need of radical new
thinking among the financial elite. We may not simply
be at the end of an era, we may be on the verge of a reformulation of
capitalism itself. However, the signs are
that there are few iconoclasts among the policy elite. Central bankers
in particular seem hopelessly stuck in their world views, starting with
their conception of their role.Bloomberg's story,
"Central
Bankers at Retreat May See Few Options to Fix Economy," would normally
get me riled up, but I am suffering from central banker fatigue. Railing
at them is an exercise in futility, so I'll just hit the high points
and encourage readers to jump into the fray.
Key excerpts:
The world's top central bankers gather at their annual U.S. mountainside
symposium today with a sense there's not much more they can do to
repair credit markets and rescue the global economy.Reports in
the last week showing a surge in inflation reinforce expectations
that Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke will have to keep
U.S. interest rates on hold. Similar conditions in Europe are paralyzing
his counterparts at the Bank of England and the European Central
Bank.
``All the central banks can provide now is time for the banking
system to heal,'' Myron Scholes, chairman of Rye Brook, New York-based
Platinum Grove Asset Management LP and a Nobel laureate in economics,
said in an interview. ``What more they have to offer is now very
limited.''....
``There isn't a lot they can do'' now, said former Fed Governor
Lyle Gramley, senior economic adviser at Stanford Group Co. in Washington.
``The Fed really has to hope and pray that credit markets begin
to heal by themselves.''...
The Fed, while leaving the benchmark interest rate unchanged
for its last two meetings, says financial markets ``remain under
considerable stress.'' One gauge watched by the Fed, the premium
for banks to borrow for three months over a measure of the future
overnight lending rate, averaged 0.77 percentage point last week,
the highest since April.
The Fed's rate cuts also have failed to pass through to the housing
market. The average rate on a 30-year fixed mortgage was 6.47 percent
last week, about where it was a year ago....
Apart from lowering rates, Bernanke has pushed the limits of
the Fed's powers to ease the crisis in credit markets. In December,
he started auctioning 28-day loans to commercial banks. He followed
that in March with a $200 billion program to auction Treasuries
to investment banks in exchange for mortgage-backed securities and
other debt. Bernanke also offered cash loans to other bond dealers
that trade with the Fed.
With all these programs in place, Fed officials may be reluctant
to do more without assurance that it will ease the credit crisis
and not do more harm.
``They have done a lot, and at some point they simply have to
give the markets the time needed to heal,'' said former Fed researcher
Brian Sack, senior economist at Macroeconomic Advisers...
Some, such as former Bank of England policy maker Willem Buiter,
who will address the meeting tomorrow, argue that the Fed's actions
to date store up trouble for the future.
``There will have to be a lot of soul searching about whether
central banks, in their rush to forestall a financial disaster,
have created moral hazard and perverse incentives on an unprecedented
scale,'' Buiter said.
The repeated use of the word "heal" says that the Fed has done a
great job of pre-selling its message and the words of realists with
Buiter will fall on deaf ears.
So what's wrong with this picture? Here is a starter list. Readers
are encouraged to add to it.
1. There is a remarkable lack of introspection. The Fed (and
by extension other central banks) seem to think they performed ably
and are victims of circumstance. They seem to see themselves as
agents that act on the system, and implicitly deny their role in
creating the current circumstances.2. Part of the lack of
introspection is how mission creep worked to their disadvantage.
The Fed in the old days understood its job: take the punchbowl away
before the party got good. But Congress gave the Fed the dual mandate
of price stability and creating full employment. The Fed was effectively
given responsibility without having authority, yet over time seemed
to develop unwarranted belief in its ability to deliver on these
objectives (as opposed to the more modest aim of doing what it could
around the margin to help). We recall hearing paeans to the financial
authorities almost like clockwork before crises (well, maybe not
1997-1998): "Gee, they have things so well under control, we won't
have a recession."
That false confidence got worse under Greenspan, who loves scouring
data and took an inordinate interest in the stock market, indeed,
seemed to regard rises in the averages as validation of his policies
(see
here for a longer discussion). And this misguided thinking conditioned
Bernanke's reflexes when the crisis hit, His priority became validating
asset prices, when the experience of Japan showed what a misguided
course of action that was. Indeed, the most successful example of
coping with a housing/banking crisis was Sweden in the early 1990s,
when the markets were permitted to fall but the authorities moved
quickly to recapitalize the banking system. Funny that we never
hear anyone in the officialdom mention that model.
The Fed even considers itself to be
in charge of the stability of the financial system , even though
Congress has not added that to its job description. Moreover, the
Fed has direct oversight over only a relatively small subset of
market participants. For instance, only 15% of non-agricultural
debt in the US falls under its purview.
Now the US central bank could kid itself that it, along with
its peers, was doing a good job based on the so-called "Great Moderation,"
a twenty-year period that featured more stable growth (although
it also came with more frequent financial crises). However, economist
Thomas Palley
disputes the conventional account of the success of this period
and the contribution of central bankers to it:
It is often said that the winners get to write history, which
matters because the way we tell history frames our understandings.
What is true for general history also holds for economic history...
The last twenty-five years have witnessed a boom in the reputation
of central bankers...based on an account of recent economic
history that reflects the views of the winners...
The raised standing of central bankers rests on a phenomenon
that economists have termed the “Great Moderation.”... the smoothing
of the business cycle over the last two decades....
Many economists attribute this smoothing to improved monetary
policy by central banks....This explanation is popular with
economists since it implicitly applauds the economics profession
by attributing improved policy to advances in economics and
increased influence of economists within central banks....
That said, there are other less celebratory accounts of the
Great Moderation that view it as a transitional phenomenon,
and one that has also come at a high cost. One reason for the
changed business cycle is retreat from policy commitment to
full employment. The great Polish economist Michal Kalecki observed
that full employment would likely cause inflation because job
security would prompt workers to demand higher wages...rather
than solving this political problem, economic policy retreated
from full employment and assisted in the evisceration of unions.
That lowered inflation, but it came at the high cost of two
decades of wage stagnation and a rupturing of the link between
wage and productivity growth....
With regard to lengthened economic expansions, the great
moderation has been driven by asset price inflation and financial
innovation, which have financed consumer spending...
The important implication is that the Great Moderation is
the result of a retreat from full employment combined with the
transitional factors of disinflation, asset price inflation,
and increased consumer borrowing. Those factors now appear exhausted.
Further disinflation will produce disruptive deflation. Asset
prices (particularly real estate) seem above levels warranted
by fundamentals, making for the danger of asset price deflation.
And many consumers have exhausted their access to credit and
now pose significant default risks.
3. Focus on monetary policy and liquidity and lack of attention
to regulatory and structural reform. The credit crisis has been
a massive indictment of financial deregulation. Yet the Fed remains
a hostage of free market ideology and what Willlem Buiter calls
"cognitive regulatory capture." The Fed is too close to banks and
industry, and almost seems to lack belief in the importance of oversight.
A full year ago, a vocal minority recognized the role of structural
failings and called for the Fed and other regulators to investigate
and develop new approaches. The proponents included
Henry Kaufman, Australia's former Reserve Bank Governor
Ian Macfarlane,
Steven Roach, and
Jim Hamilton. Kaufman in particular has offered some
sound analysis and proposals that have languished on op-ed pages
(one example here); others over the past year have pondered the
need for reform and made recommendations.
But what do we see instead? The Treasury launching a plan to
make the Fed into an uber-regulator, with the Fed having no particular
idea of what it would do with its new powers. This is the worst
of all possible worlds. The current fragmented system allows an
ambitious or progressive regulator to take ground, which forces
the other to react to protect their turf (Eugene Ludwig, head of
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in the Clinton Administration
end ran the Fed more than once).
Now one can correctly argue the central bank lacks formal authority
to do much in the way of regulatory reform. Yet first, Bernanke
has been extraordinarily aggressive in going to the limits of, even
beyond, the Fed's charter (it most assuredly did not have the authority
to stick taxpayers with the losses that eventually result from the
Bear bailout, but Congress failed even to slap the central bank
on the wrist for overstepping its bounds). Second, there has been
an intellectual vacuum about what to do about the mess. The Fed
and other central banks could readily have framed the debate and
taken the lead in proposing reforms. But that role instead seems
to have been seized by the Treasury, which seems more interested
in quick fixes and the appearance of being in charge rather than
the harder job of trying to achieve lasting progress.
I'm sure there is plenty to add to the Fed's rap sheet, and I hope readers
will provide input.
The Telegraph story that highlighted this development provided additional
detail:
Paul Kasriel, chief economist at Northern Trust, says lending by
US commercial banks contracted at an annual rate of 9.14pc in the
13 weeks to June 18, the most violent reversal since the data series
began in 1973. M2 money fell at a rate of 0.37pc...Leigh Skene
from Lombard Street Research said the lending conderve gave up being
interested in money supply in the early 1980s, when new banking
products made the data behave differently. But that hardly seemed
a reason to abandon a useful tool, at least not without trying to
understand how the new instruments affected monetary aggregates.
Instead, the Fed sets target interest rates in a not-terribly-scientific
fashion.
Note that while the Fed still published M1 (narrow money, currency
plus demand deposits) and M2 (M1 plus time deposits, savings accounts,
and non-institutional money market funds), it stopped reporting
M3 (M2 plus large time deposits, institutional money market accounts,
and short-term repos) in March 2006. However, some economists and
services provide estimates,
The Telegraph tells us today that those private calculations
of M3, like the publicly available monetary aggregates, show a sudden
contraction, a deflationary signal. From the
Telegraph:
Data compiled by Lombard Street
Research shows that the M3 ''broad money" aggregates fell by
almost $50bn (£26.8bn) in July, the biggest one-month fall since
modern records began in 1959."Monthly data
for July show that the broad money growth has almost collapsed,"
said Gabriel Stein, the group's leading monetary economist.
On a three-month basis, the M3 growth rate has fallen from
almost 19pc earlier this year to just 2.1pc (annualised) for
the period from May to July. This is below the rate of inflation,
implying a shrinkage in real terms.
The
growth in bank loans has turned negative to a halt since March.
"It's obviously worrying. People either can't borrow, or
don't want to borrow even if they can," said Mr Stein.
Monetarists say it is the sharpness
of the drop that is most disturbing, rather than the absolute
level. Moves of this speed are extremely rare....
Monetarists insist that shifts
in M3 are a lead indicator of asset prices moves, typically
six months or so ahead. If so, the latest collapse
points to a grim autumn for Wall Street and for the American
property market. As a rule of thumb, the data gives a one-year
advance signal on economic growth, and a two-year signal on
future inflation.
"There are always short-term blips but over the long run
M3 has repeatedly shown itself good leading indicator," said
Mr Stein...
M3 surged after the onset of the credit crunch, but this
was chiefly a distortion caused by the near total paralysis
in parts of the American commercial paper market. Borrowers
were forced to take out bank loans instead. The commercial paper
market has yet to recover
In his speech accepting the Democratic nomination in 1992, a
year in which economic conditions somewhat resembled those today,
Bill Clinton denounced his opponent as someone “caught in the grip
of a failed economic theory.” Where Mr. Obama spoke cryptically
in St. Petersburg about a “reckless few” who “game the system, as
we’ve seen in this housing crisis” — I know what he meant, I think,
but how many voters got it? — Mr. Clinton declared that “those who
play by the rules and keep the faith have gotten the shaft, and
those who cut corners and cut deals have been rewarded.” That’s
the kind of hard-hitting populism that’s been absent from the Obama
campaign...
Of course, Mr. Obama hasn’t given his own acceptance speech yet.
Al Gore found a new populist fervor in August 2000, and surged in
the polls. A comparable surge by Mr. Obama would give him a landslide
victory...
Bruce Wilder says...
Krugman on politics is tiresome, indeed.
If he has some evidence for his thesis
that the American People long for a populist vision, he should bring
it forward; otherwise, he should shut up. He doesn't
know what would cause Obama to surge ahead in the polls, and should
not be mind-reading the whole electorate, while pretending that
he does.
Obama has managed to draw a clear contrast on income taxes, and
is fighting to keep it from being completely obscured by our incompetent
Media. Larry Bartels is pretty clear that Obama's tax plan, as simple
as it might seem to this blog's readers, is just the kind of thing
American voters get confused about, and the Media proves incapable
of reporting on accurately. Populism is not as easy a campaign theme
as Krugman imagines.
On a number of other populist themes -- the mortgage crisis,
gas taxes, off-shore drilling -- Obama
would run some serious risks of committing himself to bad policy,
if he tries to out-demagogue McCain on these issues.
Does Krugman have any ideas about how to stop "Drill Here, Drill
Now"? I didn't think so.
Obama is ahead in the polls, which indicate -- surprise! -- that
about a third of the electorate has not paid any attention, yet.
A majority of voters in 2004 elected George W. Bush; those people
and their bad judgment haven't gone away, and their numbers, though
diminished, put a floor under McCain's support, and a ceiling on
Obama's.
Clinton's economic populism may have been a lovely thing, but
not nearly as lovely in terms of his electoral chances, as Ross
Perot. Clinton never achieved an actual majority, but he didn't
need to. Obama will have to have an actual majority to beat McCain,
but he's well on track to achieve that.
NLS says...
Bruce Wilder is on point once again. Most folks still haven't
begun to pay attention and haven't even entered the stadium. (For
example, note the traction Jackass Corsi's slash and bash book grabs.)
PK is no doubt a brilliant economist, but doesn't he understand
that injecting doubt and offering hesitation only steepens the hill?
The object of the game is to beat McCain.
Cyrille says...
Bruce Wilder on Obamania is tiresome. Anyone who speaks his mind
for anything but singing the praise of Obama is immediately rebuked.
Krugman asks to state demonstrable facts, Bruce Wilder calls
that asking to out-demagogue McCain. Uh?
Obama's lead in the polls is considerably smaller than his party's,
so surely he must be doing everything perfectly. Still, Krugman
notes that Obama has not had his acceptance speech yet, and that
it could create a surge, but that won't make him less tiresome since
he's a miscreant, he does not blindly worship.
Republican economics should these days be called names that will
get you censored if children might be watching (they should have
for the past 30 years, but now the conclusions are so obvious and
immediate as to be plain to all, even those who reckon that "in
3 years time" is too far to ever happen). Failure to do so is yet
another worrying sign that Democrats have turned into Republican
light.
They have stolen, looted, lied and ruined a country the size
of a continent for the sole benefit of them and their cronies. It's
not demagogue to hold them accountable. And it's crazy to not attack
them on that when the horrible consequences of their acts are the
main thing on everyone's mind (OK, Iraq should be as well, but now
all the media reports are sterilised and very few people in the
US will get first hand experience).
Bruce Wilder says...
str: "Did a dysfunctional primary system give us two mediocre
candidates?"
The primary systems of the two parties are quite different, and
they produced contrasting candidates. Obama is a an excellent, historic
candidate, leading an extraordinarily capable campaign organization,
and an enthusiastic, motivated Party.
McCain is a pretty typical Republican Presidential candidate:
bereft of principles, callow, stupid, a serial liar, he's really
old and he heads a campaign organization staffed from top-to-bottom
with corrupt lobbyists. But, it wasn't a dysfunctional primary process
that produced McCain, anymore than it was a dysfunctional primary
process that produced Richard Nixon, Spiro Agnew, Ronald Reagan,
Dan Quayle, George W. Bush or Richard Bruce Cheney. The Republican
Party is designed to produce liars and fools and crooks, in service
to the plutocracy.
"Crushed by ballooning debts, the regeneration by the banks' own
efforts is becoming impossible ... I bet stocks will decline further
and U.S. bonds will be downgraded." said
Tetsuhisa Hayashi, chief manager of foreign-exchange trading at
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd. in Tokyo
Bloomberg.com
``Crushed by ballooning debts, the regeneration by the banks'
own efforts is becoming impossible,'' said
Tetsuhisa Hayashi, chief manager of foreign-exchange trading
at Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd. in Tokyo, a unit of Japan's
largest lender by market value. ``I bet stocks will decline further
and U.S. bonds will be downgraded. Risk aversion among investors
will cause further yen-buying.''
The Japanese currency may rise to 100 per dollar by year- end,
Hayashi said.
For banks it's looking increasingly difficult to refinance their
debt. Outside Fed oxygen lines are cut and for those of life support
this is it.
Lehman is now expected to report a quarterly loss that analysts
peg as high as $2.6 billion. Recall that last quarter's $2.8 billion
loss was a stunner, nearly ten times the expected level, and a dramatic
departure from the convention of preparing investors for earnings
shortfalls.
Comments
- Looking increasingly difficult to get
oxygen. LEH reportedly having problems shopping its CMBS portfolio.
You think? As the cost of debt rises
(Amex 400 bps off treasury on Friday) the choke hold gets tighter.
Bloomberg goes on to wonder what institutions are worth saving?
Earnings season should be interesting.
Clearly the companies are trying to get out in
front with estimate cuts coming earlier by an inch. The upside
surprise will be credit deterioration which will be accretive
to earnings and help offset some of the charges (what a world!).
The cruches are failing, wheelbarrows
next.
Discredited "free marketers" which got the country in the current
mess try to counterattack using Wall street's "fifth column" of
PPP journalists.
Amity Shlaes, who is a nice example of the genre published apologetic
Five Ways to Wreck a Recovery - washingtonpost.com which twists
major facts about Great Depression. She does not have formal economic
education (bachelor degree in English literature from Yale)
Moon of Alabama used this chart to chat about Schlaes.
GDP numbers according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis (bigger
graph)
A.
Smoot Hawley Tarrif Act In March 1932 the United States Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs established hearings
to investigate the causes of the Wall Street Crash of 1929.B.
Democrats took over Congress in November 1932 and in early 1933
appointed
Ferdinand Pecora as commission counselor. Pecora found many
malpractices on Wall Street and his investigation led to the creation
of the Securities and Exchange Commission. We can put these events
at point B of the GDP chart
C. Hoover's tax decrease in 1929/30 was followed by four years
of decreasing GDP. His "misstep" tax increase was enacted in 1932
and took effect only in 1933, point C in our graph. From there on
GDP went up.
D.
New Deal beginnings.
Shlaes, according to her Wikipedia entry "has no formal economic
training." That certainly shows. She also seems to have zero training
in history as she is unable to organize the sequence of events in
a coherent way. Events and policies that obviously led to increases
in GDP are attributed as having deepened the depression.
(reformatted by rdan for a quick take....the original is more
detailed and much longer. I personally would not use wikipedia as
an academic source, but liberties are taken and the articles linked
looked reasonably accurate))
Battered US financial groups
will have to refinance billions of dollars in maturing debt
over coming months, a move likely to push banks’ funding costs higher
and curb their profitability, say bankers and analysts. The banks’
push to raise capital to offset mounting credit-related losses is
forcing them to pay higher interest rates to entice investors, which
is likely to put pressure on earnings and could lead to higher lending
rates. Last week, groups including Citigroup, JPMorgan and AIG borrowed
almost $20bn in new long-term debt, paying some of the highest rates
ever in order to lock in funding. The wave of refinancing is set
to continue for several months as billions of dollars in bank debt
come due.
This entry was posted by Gwen Robinson
on Monday, August 18th, 2008 at 5:28 and is filed under
Capital markets. You can follow any responses to this entry
through the
RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response,
or
trackback from your own site.
Middle-class and lower definitely lost a lot of buying power during
the last two years. And with 3% CD and 5% inflation they are losing
their savings in all accounts: taxable, Roth and 401K.
The Bureau
of Labor Statistics reported yesterday that its primary consumer
price index CPI-U rose 5.6% over the last year. That's the highest
inflation rate in 17 years, the newspapers all
call to our attention. Just how concerned should we be about
these numbers?
Comments
Posted by:
sonia at August
15, 2008 06:35 PM
How shall we define stagflation?
I suggest whenever unemployment is above 5% and when inflation
is above 5% at the same time.
That's June and July 2008. Houston we have stagflation.
Posted by:
One Salient Oversight at August 15, 2008 08:34 PM
Those expecting diminishing inflation,
please contemplate CD rates of 3% (on which the holder must pay
income tax) when the reported CPI is 5.6%. What person
would lend his savings in such a money-losing proposition? Is this
the result of a free market or of a central bank lending out money
that has never been saved but created out of thin air? MZM & M2
are growing a lot faster than GDP & have been for some time.The
central banks of China, Russia, India, Saudi Arabia, et al are behaving
similarly. The global credit bubble,
Bernanke's savings glut, will collapse in due course. But it seems
to me we aren't there yet & therefore are beset by inflation.
Posted by: Anonymous at August 17, 2008 11:57
AM
Posted by: OER at August 15, 2008 10:49 PM
sjp wrote:Inflation is about the price level moving up.
I am bringing this up because the true mechanics of inflation
must be a combination of (among other things) the extension of money/credit
that algernon refers to and the raising of prices that I posited.
One can't just point the finger at money supply expansion as the
root of inflation. It is clearly an important part, but not the
complete picture.
sjp,
I will pass on your incorrect definition of inflation as price
increases to stay on topic.
Can you give me the mechanism where prices can increase with
a constant money supply without reducing consumption? If you have
an economy of $5 and 5 things how can the price of the each thing
move to $1.10 and consumers still consume 5 things with a $5 money
supply?
Posted by: DickF at August 16, 2008 02:28 PM
DickF - they'd put it on their visas!
When economists talk about wage demands being muted, they don't
seem to understand how much American households have gotten into
the habit of taking their future wages out as borrowed money. If
I have the ability to pay 1.10 with a credit card, I can overlook
that shortfall in my real income. By using behavioral patterns which
were true in the 70s but are not true today to connect commodity
prices to wages, economists are overlooking a central feature of
the economy they have wrought. In fact, dissolving limits on credit
has been the only way that the "grand moderation" could be swallowed
by the American public at large. If they had to live within their
real incomes, the increases in the compensation of the wealthiest
group - the CEOS, the hedge funders - would simply be politically
impossible. As credit is squeezed and Americans have to live within
their real incomes, look for inequality to become a much hotter
issue. It is the credit squeeze more than inflation that is going
to jumpstart pressure to raise wages.
DickF: my definition of inflation is a rise in the price
level. The only point I'm making is to dispute algernon's point;
I took algernon's point to be that inflation comes solely from
money supply expansion. I say that's not true.
I believe that
the problem subsequently raised with my thought experiment (0
growth, 0 money supply growth, price increases) is that it is
non-equilibrium. What Anonymous suggested makes sense. On the
other hand, the economy might realize that the price increases
weren't warranted and drop the price back down -- this might
be the outcome DickF sees for his scenario. I thought a non-equilibrium
thought experiment might be worth considering, though, since
the jumping off point for this post is that the oil price increases
we saw in the summer have been followed by price decreases:
we are talking about fluctuations about the equilibrium.
I am most interested in Justin's point, that these oil price
fluctuations might inordinately affect consumers' inflation
expectations. It makes me wonder if certain high-profile products
are weighted highly in consumers' belief formation mechanisms.
Have oil price shocks been associated with shocks to consumers'
inflation expectations, and is this association stronger than
the association with other commodities?
Posted by: sjp at August 17, 2008 02:21 PM
DickF asks "Can you give me the mechanism where prices can increase
with a constant money supply without reducing consumption?"Simple,
the rate of circulation of money can increase or decrease. Thus
even if the supply of money remains the same prices can change.
And of course, there are many types of virtual money that can step
into the gap, taking the place of money, debit accounts, credit
accounts, loans of all descriptions etc.
Posted by:
bill j at August
18, 2008 03:54 AM
Roger,Your comment about Visas did make me laugh, but understand
that credit works within an economy unless the government facilitates
credit expansion with an increase in the money supply so credit
in itself does not create inflation.
sjp,
Inflation is a decline in the value of money. It may lead to
a rise in the price level, but a rise in the price level is not
inflation. This is a huge misconception in economic circles that
leads to serious misunderstandings.
If you introduce other elements into your thought experiment
such as consumption preferences then yes you can create a scenario
where such price increase might be accomodated, but the thought
process must be deeper than a fixed money supply with rising prices.
That simply is not possible without external input meaning consumption
preferences, saving preferences, etc.
This is important to understand because without the complicity
of the monetary authorities an economy cannot experience inflation.
Understand that a change in consumption preferences is not inflationary.
bill j,
A change in circulation of money does not exist in a vacuum.
There must be other changes such as consumption preferences for
this to happen. Dig deeper.
So now we have magazine covers fretting over oil, pundits everywhere
calling for $200 oil, and BusinessWeek articles "Bracing For Inflation"
in spite of a slowing world economy. These are all contrarian indicators.
And as goes oil, so goes the CPI. So unless there is a breakout
of War in the Mideast, the oil bust may be deeper and longer lasting
than anyone thinks.
While even moral hazard hawks generally agree that some sort
of government intervention would be needed in the event of financial
trouble at Fannie and Freddie, the most compelling reason was that
the US, chronically dependent on foreign funding, would be ill advised
to treat its money sources badly.
Of the GSEs' $5.2 trillion in debt (their own corporate bonds
plus MBS),
$1.3 trillion is in the hands of foreign investors and central banks.
The speed with which the powers that be cobbled together a support
program was seen in some circles as an admission of the importance
of reassuring our friendly overseas credit suppliers.
If that was the motivation, it isn't working. As we and others
noted, spreads on
GSE debt have risen to 215 basis points over Treasuries, only
a tad shy of the pre-Bear crisis level of 238 basis points. And
remember, they have reached this stratospheric levels despite the
Paulson rescue package, despite an alphabet soup of new Fed facilities
that accept GSE paper as collateral (as the discount window did)
now in place (although there were raspberries all around for the
bailout bill, due to its failure to make any changes in the operation,
management, or policies of the GSEs and its lack of specificity
as to triggers and what mechanism would be used).
And the reason? A big factor is that
foreign central banks are exiting GSE debt and have pulled back
significantly from purchases of new paper. This vote
of no confidence appears likely to force the Administration's hand
and lead it to take more concrete measures to prop up Freddie's
and Fannie's balance sheets. They are not about to risk a spike
in mortgage rates and further trouble in the housing markets with
elections approaching.
From
Reuters:
An extraordinary Treasury capital infusion may be needed to
restore faltering foreign demand for debt issued by Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, the two top home funding sources that the government
is willing to rescue to save the housing market.The companies
rely heavily on overseas investment, often up to two-thirds
of each new multibillion-dollar note offering, to help pare
funding costs and keep mortgage rates low.
But foreign central banks have dumped nearly $11 billion
from their record holdings of this debt in four weeks, to $975
billion, and won't return in force before it's clear if -- and
how -- the government will back Fannie and Freddie, some analysts
say....
The bonds these companies issue in the $4.5 trillion agency
MBS market are near or worse than the weakest levels, set in
March before the government engineered the sale of failing Bear
Stearns to JPMorgan.
... ... ...
Overseas investors took an atypical back seat in Fannie Mae's
three-year note sale this week.
Central banks bought just 37 percent of the $3.5 billion
issue, down from 56 percent in May's $4 billion offering of
the same maturity. Asia accounts took just 22 percent of the
notes, down from 42 percent in May....
Comments
Looks like a weak article which generated interesting comments.
The key question is whether peak oil will negatively influence international
trade. It is clear that distance now matters more.
Will the rising price of oil reduce international trade as some
have suggested? According to this research, which uses a gravity
model of international trade to answer the question, thpntries trade
more on international markets today than ever before – both in absolute
terms and as a proportion of their national output. How can we explain
this phenomenal increase in international trade over the past few
decades? Will the recent
rise in oil prices
reverse this trend of globalisation?
History provides us with a natural comparison. Beginning in the
nineteenth century, the world saw a remarkable rise in international
trade that came to a grinding halt during World War I and later
on in the wake of the Great Depression. This “first
wave of globalisation” from about 1870 until 1913 led to a degree
of international integration – measured by trade-to-output ratios
– that many countries only achieved again in the mid-1990s.
Taking a comparative perspective, we juxtapose the first wave
of globalisation from 1870 to 1913 and the second wave after World
War II. We also study the retreat of world trade during the interwar
period from 1921 to 1939. We are interested in the driving forces
behind these trade booms and trade busts. Was it changes in global
output or changes in trade costs that explain the evolution of international
trade?
Comments
- Trance says...
- "for example, consumers have managed oil prices at almost five
times the going price before the 70s inflation."
but this is done
at the cost of diminishing discretionary income (which is worse
in Europe than US). This discretionary income would otherwise go
elsewhere in the economy. This money now goes into only one pocket,
the oil industry.
- Bruce Wilder says...
- "they find that there is little systematic evidence to suggest
that the maritime transport revolution was a primary driver of the
late nineteenth century global trade boom. Rather, the most powerful
force driving the boom was the secular rise in incomes across countries."
"the key innovations in the shipping industry were induced technological
responses to the heightened trading potential of the world."
I think one would have to have a much better model of international
trade, to sort this out reliably. Talking rather generically and
bloodlessly about "the secular rise in incomes" seems almost a distraction.
What drives trade, international and local, are the productivity
gains from specialization. These gains from specialization can rest
on a variety of quite different bases. By focusing on "international"
trade in particular, we are focusing on goods, where the productivity
gains from specialization are extreme. In common parlance, there
might be a monopoly of technical knowledge, extreme economies of
scale or external economies, or a gift of nature, which can be exploited
in only rare places. Not very many people will find it worthwhile
to go more than a few blocks to get a haircut, even though most
people will go to a professional barber or hairstylist. On the other
hand, prospecting for oil in one's backyard, or refining it one's
self, is rarely worthwhile. Nor do people go to a local craftsman
for a television or cellphone.
The period, 1870-1913, marks the
Second Industrial Revolution, a misnamed third or fourth phase
of industrial revolution that began in Britain in the 18th century.
Steamships were rather famously a central part of this phase --
their ability to keep to a schedule as important as their speed
and capacity, and the ability to adapt them to more efficient means
of carrying specialized cargoes (oil tankers, refrigerated ships,
etc)
In addition, the industrial revolution was widening its geographical
scope in three important respects. First, the industrial revolution
was spreading out, to the Low Countries, Switzerland, France, the
U.S. and Germany. After 1820, the industrial revolution was no longer
occurring in one country only, and it was accelerating. Moreover,
after 1870, the industrial revolution was involving more and more
industries, moving from textiles and steam engines and railroads,
to steel, oil, chemicals, electricity, with leadership often passing
to countries other than Britain.
And, thirdly, as the industrial revolution drove economic growth,
it drove demand for the fruits of the earth, sucking up everything
from guano and bananas to copper and petroleum from distant places.
The ability to wrest enormous factor productivity gains from
specced by the extent of the market, then we shouldn't be surprised
to see the rise of national consumer markets in response to transportation
and communication innovations: this is the period in which J. Walter
Thompson invented magazine advertising (1877), and brandnames emerge,
Nabisco (1901) and Coca-Cola (1886) and Lucky Strike (1871, 1907),
Colgate toothpaste (1872) and Palmolive soap (1898).
Somehow, for me, "the secular rise in incomes" doesn't quite
cover it.
If one is not going to be serious about analyzing what drives
trade, I don't see how empty statements projecting that trends can
continue really mean anything.
The right thing is to think seriously about distinguishing between
the factors driving trade in commodities and fruits of the earth,
and what drives trade in manufactured goods, and, finally, what
drives trade in services. Underlying all of this is what drives
specialization.
Peak oil implies no further gross increases in trade in raw petroleum.
Similar considerations apply to many raw mineral products, like
copper and zinc, and other commodities. Industrial development and
rising population in the Persian Gulf will also result in more trade
in petroleum products, as the expense of raw petroleum.
Peak oil also implies rising relative cost of jet fuel -- air
travel is going to get more expensive, and with vacation travel
to exotic places. (Recreational and business travel is a significant
part of international trade.)
The kind of intense specialization, which yields enormous factor
productivity enhancement, typically involves a coordination and
control, which entails communication. Communication advances were
important complements to the increasing speed and falling cost of
transporation in 1870-1913, as well as now.
A useful analytical exercise might focus on whether falling communication
costs, increasing capability imply more or less physical trade in
goods. McDonald's, Toyota, IKEA, Lenovo -- are the limits to economies
of scale of physical product in one place such that, say, all the
corkscrews in the world should be made in one place?
Or, does falling costs of communication and control imply more
widely distributed physical production of manufactured goods and
less physical transport?
If we could leverage computers to design a washing machine plant,
to flexibly build several different models or designs of washing
machines, would we care to import washing machines from Sweden or
Italy or China, and would they want to import washing machines from
Benton Harbor, Michigan?
How does the financial interact with trade? If a country fails
to invest in the production capacity to make and export goods and
services in sectors where the gains in total factor productivity
are greatest, how does that affect the terms of trade? Median incomes?
If not "protectionism", what is an organizing principle for a national
strategy? (Is there nothing more convincing that pieties about education,
and taxcuts for plutocrats?)
- robertdfeinman says...
- Perhaps the analysis is backwards. The rise of highly efficient
production produced an excess of manufactured goods (or at least
the capacity to make them). This then led firms to seek markets
elsewhere. Because of the efficiency trade costs were not enough
to deter this trend.
As trade increased the efficiency of trade also improved and
its costs dropped as well. The depression caused a loss of markets
and trade dropped. The "protectionism" was a political attempt to
fix something which was misguided effort, just like offshore drilling
is the wrong fix now. The lack of markets caused a drop off in innovation
so trade costs stopped dropping, then the wars intervened and destroyed
productive capacity and markets.
In the latest round, the cycle has repeated, this time there
has been a new set of innovations in IT and supply chain management
and a corresponding rise in efficiency with containerization and
high speed ships. Both these improvements have now stalled so other
factors have started to become more important.
The response to this has been yet another set of political nostrums
designed for their ear appeal to the public, rather than for their
efficacy.
Just a conjecture...
- roger says...
- Huh, is this economics of numerology:
"To answer that question
we set up a gravity model of international trade. This model borrows
Isaac Newton’s insight that the gravitational force between two
planets in space is inversely related to their physical distance.
Instead of planets, we consider countries whose “gravitational force”
is the amount of their bilateral exports and imports. Instead of
physical distance, bilateral trade is impeded by trade costs such
as transportation costs, tariffs and language barriers."
Wow, and this is considered serious economics! Why not borrow
their model from, say, Revelations, where the antichrist - protectionists
- put a bar code on their followers heads, with the bar code being
legislation designed to discourage trade. It would make the same
amount of sense.
This doesn't even achieve a low level of chicanery.
- dissent says...
- "overall, history gives us little reason to expect a sharp and
fundamental reaction of international trade in response to changes
in transportation costs."
The problem
with this argument is that all prior history took place prior to
peak oil. Transportation costs will be impacted by peak oil in a
historically anomalous fashion.
Krugnam understanding of politics is definitely limited, but the
observation that there will be more intense struggle for limited natural
resources might be true...
Is the "second great age of globalization" about to end?:
The Great Illusion, by Paul Krugman, Commentary, NY Times:
...as I was reading the latest bad news, I found myself
wondering whether this war is an omen — a sign that the second
great age of globalization may share the fate of the first
... ... ...
But then came three decades of war, revolution, political
instability, depression and more war. By the end of World War
II, the world was fragmented economically as well as politically.
And it took a couple of generations to put it back together.
So, can things fall apart again? Yes, they can.
Consider ... the current food crisis. For years we were told
that self-sufficiency was ... outmoded..., that it was safe
to rely on world markets for food supplies. But when the prices
of wheat, rice and corn soared, Keynes’s “projects and politics”
of “restrictions and exclusion” made a comeback: many governments
rushed to protect domestic consumers by banning or limiting
exports, leaving food-importing countries in dire straits.
... ... ...
Angell was right to describe the belief that conquest pays
as a great illusion. But the belief that economic rationality
always prevents war is an equally great illusion. And today’s
high degree of global economic interdependence, which can be
sustained only if all major governments act sensibly, is more
fragile than we imagine.
Alex Tolley says...
But the belief that economic rationality always prevents war
is an equally great illusion. And today’s high degree of global
economic interdependence, which can be sustained only if all major
governments act sensibly, is more fragile than we imagine.
Anyone with the slightest sense of history does not have these
illusions. All the knowledge gained in the last 100 years that could
be used to understand how best to manage human affairs is overridden
by base human nature. In our (US) own milieu, we have at least half
the population that is effectively anti-science and prefers to make
emotional decisions and votes for political candidates that do the
same thing. The US congress routinely votes on emotional or ideological
lines only. I see no evidence that the rest of the world is any
less irrational.
A very important book now available for free..
Yet gold crashes. It has failed to deliver on its core promises
as a safe-haven and inflation hedge, at least for now. Why?
Four possible answers:
1) Nobody seriously believes that Russia will over-play its
hand. The world could not care less about Georgia anyway. Ergo,
this is a bogus geopolitical crisis.
2) The inflation story is vastly exaggerated in the OECD
core of countries that still make up 60pc of the global economy.
The price of gold is already looking beyond the oil and food
spike of early to mid 2008 (a lagging indicator of loose money
two to three years ago) to the much more serious matter of debt-deflation
that lies ahead.
3) The seven-year slide of the dollar is over as investors
at last wake up to the reality that the global economy is falling
off a cliff. Indeed, the US is the only G7 country that is not
yet in or on the cusp recession. (It soon will be, but by then
others will be prostrate). As an anti-dollar play, gold is finished
for this cycle.
4) The entire commodity boom has hit the buffers. Looming
world recession (growth below 3pc on the IMF definition) trumps
the supercycle for the time being.
Gold has fallen from $1030 an ounce in February to $807 today
in London trading. It has collapsed through key layers of technical
support, triggering automatic stop-loss sales.
The Goldman Sachs short-position that
I have been observing with some curiosity has paid off.
For gold bugs, the unthinkable has now happened. The metal has
fallen through its 50-week moving average, the key support line
that has held solid through the seven-year bull market. This week
is not over yet, of course. If gold recovers enough in coming days,
it could still close above the line.
Courtesy of my old colleague Peter Brimelow - whose columns on
gold are a must-read - note that
Australia's Privateer point and figure chart has also broken
its upward line for the first time since 2002. This is serious technical
damage.
So have we reached the moment when gold bugs must start questioning
their deepest assumptions. Have they
bought too deeply into the "dollar-collapse/M3 monetary bubble"
tale, ignoring all the other moving parts in the complex global
system? Nobody wants to be left holding the bag all
the way down to the bottom of the slide, long after the hedge funds
have sold out.
Well, my own view is that gold bugs
should start looking very closely at something else: the implosion
of Europe. (Japan is in recession too)
Germany's economy shrank by 1pc in Q2. Italy shrank by 0.3pc.
Spain is sliding into a crisis that looks all too like the early
stages of Argentina's debacle in 2001. The head of the Spanish banking
federation today pleaded with the European Central Bank for rescue
measures to end the credit crisis.
The slow-burn damage of the over-valued euro is becoming apparent
in every corner of the eurozone. The
ECB misjudged the severity of the downturn, as executive board member
Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi admitted today in the Italian press.
By raising interest rates into the teeth of the storm
last month, Frankfurt has made it that much more likely that parts
of Europe's credit system will seize up as defaults snowball next
year.
As readers know, I do not believe the eurozone is a fully workable
currency union over the long run. There was a momentary "convergence"
when the currencies were fixed in perpetuity, mostly in 1995. They
have diverged ever since. The rift between North and South was not
enough to fracture the system in the first post-EMU downturn, the
dotcom bust. We have moved a long way since then. The Club Med bloc
is now massively dependent on capital inflows from North Europe
to plug their current account gaps: Spain (10pc), Portugal (10pc),
Greece (14pc). UBS warned that these flows are no longer forthcoming.
The central banks of Asia, the Mid-East,
and Russia have been parking a chunk of their $6 trillion reserves
in European bonds on the assumption that the euro can serve as a
twin pillar of the global monetary system alongside the dollar.
But the euro is nothing like the dollar. It has no European government,
tax, or social security system to back it up. Each member country
is sovereign, each fiercely proud, answering to its own ancient
rythms.
It lacks the mechanism of "fiscal transfers" to switch money
to depressed regions. The Babel of languages keeps workers pinned
down in their own country. The escape valve of labour mobility is
half-blocked. We are about to find out whether EMU really has the
levels of political solidarity of a nation, the kind that holds
America's currency union together through storms.
My guess is that political protest will mark the next phase of
this drama. Almost half a million people have lost their jobs in
Spain alone over the last year. At some point, the feeling of national
impotence in the face of monetary rule from Frankfurt will erupt
into popular fury. The ECB will swallow its pride and opt for a
weak euro policy, or face its own destruction.
What we are about to see is a race to the bottom by the world's
major currencies as each tries to devalue against others in a beggar-thy-neighbour
policy to shore up exports, or indeed simply because they have to
cut rates frantically to stave off the consequences of debt-deleveraging
and the risk of an outright Slump.
When that happens - if it is not already happening - it will
become clear that the both pillars of the global monetary system
are unstable, infested with the dry rot of excess debt.
The Fed has already invoked Article 13 (3) - the "unusual and
exigent circumstances" clause last used in the Great Depression
- to rescue Bear Stearns. The US Treasury has since had to shore
up Fannie and Freddie, the world's two biggest financial institutions.
Europe's turn will come next. We will discover that Europe cannot
conduct such rescues. There is no lender of last resort in the system.
The ECB is prohibited by the Maastricht Treaty from carrying out
direct bail-outs. There is no EU treasury. So the answer will be
drift and paralysis.
When EU Single Market Commissioner Charlie McCreevy was asked
at a dinner what Brussels would have done if the eurozone faced
a crisis like Bear Stearns, he rolled his eyes and thanked the Heavens
that so such crisis had yet happened.
It will.
Gold bugs, you ain't seen nothing yet. Gold at $800 looks like
a bargain in the new world currency disorder.
[Aug 14, 2008] Making Markets Work for Everyone
This is an important post that shows how free market retoric was
abused to enrich few at the expence of many...
Greg Anrig via Brad DeLong:
Greg Anrig on the GOP, by Brad DeLong: He smells a wind
from out of the west:
McCain's Problem Isn't His Tactics. It's GOP Ideas.:
At long last, the conservative juggernaut is cracking up.
From the Reagan era until late 2005 or so, conservatives
crushed progressives like me in debates as reliably as the
Harlem Globetrotters owned the Washington Generals. The
right would eloquently praise the virtues of free markets
and the magic of the invisible hand. We would respond by
stammering about the importance of regulation and a mixed
economy, knowing even as the words came out that our audience
was becoming bored.
Conservatives would get knowing laughs by mocking bureaucrats.
We would drone on about how everyone can benefit from the
experience and expertise of able civil servants. ... They
offered tax cuts. We talked amorphously about taxes as the
price of a civilized society. ...
But now, seemingly all of
a sudden, conservatives are the ones who are tongue-tied,
as demonstrated by Sen. John McCain's limping, message-free
presidential campaign. McCain's ongoing difficulties in
exciting voters aren't just a tactical problem; his woes
stem largely from his long-standing adherence to a set of
ideas that simply haven't worked in practice.
The belief system and finely crafted policy pitches that
enabled the right to dominate the war of ideas for the past
30 years have produced a relentless succession of governing
failures, from Iraq to Katrina to the economy to the environment.
Largely as a consequence, the public's attitude toward
government -- Ronald Reagan's bête noire -- has shifted.
A recent Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll found that, by
a 53-to-42 percent margin, Americans want government to
"do more to solve problems"; a dozen years ago, respondents
opposed government action by 2 to 1. Meanwhile, Republican
constituency groups' long-standing determination to put
aside their often significant differences and band together
to support GOP candidates is fracturing: The libertarian
darling Ron Paul and the evangelical Christian leader James
C. Dobson are among the Republican bigwigs who haven't so
far endorsed McCain. ...
As I listen to leading voices and thinkers on the right
pondering the condition of their ideology, it is increasingly
clear to me that they face a fundamental dilemma -- one
that cannot be resolved anytime soon and that might well
leave the conservative movement out to pasture for as long
as we progressives have been powerlessly chewing grass.
That choice is whether to stick with rhetoric and policies
wedded to free markets, limited government and bellicose
unilateralism, or to endorse a more robust role for the
public sector at home while relying more on diplomacy and
international institutions abroad.
Either way, conservative Republicans seem destined
to have a much harder time winning elections for the foreseeable
future. Just ask McCain how much fun he's having.
The single theme that most animated the modern conservative
movement was the conviction that government was the problem
and market forces the solution. It was a simple, elegant,
politically attractive idea, and the right applied it to
virtually every major domestic challenge -- retirement security,
health care, education, jobs, the environment and so on.
Whatever the issue, conservatives proposed substituting
market forces for government -- pushing the bureaucrats
aside and letting private-sector competition work to everyone's
benefit.
So they advocated creating health savings accounts, handing
out school vouchers, privatizing Social Security, shifting
government functions to private contractors, and curtailing
regulations on public health, safety, the environment and
more. And, of course, they pushed to cut taxes to further
weaken the public sector by "starving the beast." President
Bush has followed this playbook more closely than any previous
president, including Reagan, notwithstanding today's desperate
efforts by the right to distance itself from the deeply
unpopular chief executive.
But in practice, those ideas have all failed to deliver...
Conservatives will contest that "President Bush has followed
this playbook more closely than ... Reagan." They'll try to
argue that the problem is the Bush administration, not conservative
ideas. In fact, liberals
make this argument too:
[T]he free-market, supply-side crowd... had behind them
the authority of a vast academic establishment, ranging
from Friedrich von Hayek to Milton Friedman to such contemporaries
as Gary Becker and Robert Mundell... The academic economics
of the 1970s lined up behind the right-wing politics of
the 1980s for a reason. Reaganomics had a logic. ... Deregulation,
above all, would substitute the invisible hand of the "efficient
market" for the dead hand of bureaucracy.
The judicial coup of December
2000 that installed Bush and Cheney brought back some of
Reagan's men and his most extreme policies - tax cuts for
the wealthy, big increases in military spending, aggressive
deregulation. But it didn't bring back the
ideas. Instead, it became clear that Bush and Cheney had
no real ideas, no larger public justification. They cut
taxes to enrich their supporters. ... They were willing
to have the government spend like a drunken sailor in 2003/4
to boost the economy before the election. ...
It was very interesting to me that some of the first
to sense this loss of public purpose were the very conservatives
who had swept in with Reagan. The nemeses of my youth, people
like Bruce Bartlett, Paul Craig Roberts, the late Jude Wanniski,
went over into hard opposition..., at the core they felt
that Bush had no conservative convictions.
The free market rhetoric still has power even when it offers
false hopes. In previous campaigns we heard how tax cuts would
pay for themselves. Cut taxes and get the government out of
the way, the argument goes, and output will grow so much that
taxes will actually rise. That, of course, didn't happen. This
campaign, it's offshore drilling. Offshore drilling won't lower
oil prices, that's a false hope, yet the cry that government
imposed environmental restrictions are causing higher prices
has had some success. Let the market work, we hear, and it will
solve the problem. There are other of signs that politicians
are not yet ready to abandon the free-market message. When it
comes to health care reform, the Obama campaign fears the word
mandates for a reason, and prefers to push a plan that
has "many private health insurance options." Talk of raising
taxes and increasing the size of government is avoided, and
Democrats step very lightly around free trade. The idea that
the market works still has resonance.
So my instinct is different.
Markets do what we expect them to do - they allocate resources
efficiently - when they operate under the proper conditions.
Those conditions include lack of market power among market participants,
the lack of political influence, having the proper regulatory
structure in place, and so on. Using anti-government ideology,
conservatives have undermined rather than supported the market
system, and that's the important message. Take deregulation
as an example. There were certainly places where government
overreached, and removing regulations in those cases was needed,
but thoughtlessly stripping away any rule or regulation pertaining
to business that you encounter is not the way to create a market
system that functions optimally.
I want Democrats to make it clear that we aren't opposed
to markets, not at all, and to say it forcefully. In fact, we
like markets so much we want to fix the ones that are broken
from so many years of neglect by Republican administrations.
We want to make markets work for everyone, not just a few at
the very top who are able to work the system to their advantage.
We have a pretty good idea of what it takes for markets to function
well, and it requires active government involvement to create
the conditions and supporting institutions for markets to flourish.
That type of government oversight has been absent under Republican
administrations - see the financial meltdown - and it's up to
Democrats to step up and fill the void.
The confusion here is simple, I think. Free markets - where
free simply means minimal government involvement - are not necessarily
the same as competitive markets. There is nothing that says
what many interpret as freeing markets - lifting all government
restrictions - will give us competitive markets, not at all.
Government regulation (as well as laws, social norms, etc.)
is often necessary to help markets approach competitive ideals.
Environmental restrictions that force producers to internalize
all costs of production m
In other words, the proper inflation measure of GDP includes the effect of prices on foreign buyers as well as American consumers.
It's an open economy after all.
One of the bloggers you quote is also famous for promoting the idea that the measurement of savings is wrong because it doesn't include marked to market changes for assets.
Similar errors - the problem lies in not understanding (or being unwilling to understand) what the scope of the measurement is intended to be.
With all due respect, with an export sector of roughly 15% of GDP, it is well nigh impossible to reconcile a 2Q GDP deflator of 1.2% with a CPI-U running at 4.3% over the last year (and stronger appreciation in 2Q) and a PPI rising at 8.9% in the last year (and again, faster in 2Q).
Nor is there any reason to expect that exports are decreasing their prices in dollar terms. A weak dollar in fact permits them to increase prices in $; that's an oft-cited worry, that manufacturers become fat and lazy with a weak currency, either increasing prices and fattening their margins, or simply failing to innovate since the price advantage lessens the pressure to improve features or quality.
Further, as we noted in a recent post, policymakers are worried that much of our export gains are skewed towards commodities, not finished goods. You'd need to look at a US basket of commodity exports to come up with the right number to determine how their prices changed over the quarter.
Nevertheless, I imagine most readers of this blog would be delighted to bet $100 against you that US commodity export prices overall fell in dollar terms from the end of 1Q to the end of 2Q. The dollar rally did not occur until July.
The fact that Barry Ritholtz is off the mark upon occasion does not refute any of the arguments of his cited above.
And that marvelous tidbit from Genesis, that the deflator for non-financials was negative, says how dubious this entire exercise is.
Political manipulation?
However, perhaps the overwhelming profits in commodities (oil especially_) and estimated profits from future uncollected loans are skewing the figures. One gal making a million an hour makes 10,000 guys look like they're doing well even if they are losing individual income while they are included in the same quantity averaged with the million an hour person. That's the law of averages. Just a few wild successes make the whole pie look good. We know how a few Mobile Exxons are doing. Of course 10,000 small businesses are failing at the same time but that's statistic not parsed in the overall "growth".
Growth like this reminds me of cancer.
So let’s get the picture straight:
To believe in today’s revised GDP data, we have to believe that...
1. We are seeing near-record deflation in the nonfarm nonfinancial corporate sector.
2. We are seeing double-digit earnings growth in the financial arena.
3. Productivity growth is running at a near-3.5% pace and as such, “potential” GDP growth is close to 5% (we’d like to believe that, but it can’t be true).
4. Unit labor costs in the nonfarm nonfinancial sector were actually declining at a 2.2% annual rate in the second quarter (again, being bond bulls, nothing would make us happier if this were all true),
5. Somehow, in a quarter which saw the CPI rise at a 5% annual rate and PPI up by more than a 10% annual rate – both accelerating over the 1Q runup – the GDP price deflator managed to decelerate from a 2.6% annual rate in 1Q to a 1.2% annual rate in 2Q, the softest economy-wide inflation print in a decade (and recall, the 2Q ends in June when the commodity bubble was just about to reach its climax).
We are non-believers...